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ABSTRACT
Since the seminal Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe school prayer case, courts have been
inundated with constitutional claims involving student religious speech at public schools. Courts have struggled
mightily with the question of whether this speech is private speech, which is free of Establishment Clause
constraints, or government speech, which is subject to the bounds of that clause. In this struggle, some courts have
gotten lost in the maze of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and forgotten the core principles of justiciability and
hierarchical precedent. Instead, they have resorted to advisory opinions, ipse dixit, or judicial fiat, which has
only served to make the fundamental Establishment Clause government speech and private speech dichotomy less
clear. This Article provides a close examination of two of the most egregious recent examples as a vehicle to
advocate against the use of advisory opinions and judicial fiat in this area of jurisprudence. It then provides a
clear foundational framework, which consists of a justiciability requirement and a precedential requirement, for
the judicial evaluation of religious student-speech classification claims in school law establishment cases. This
framework is offered to counteract extant harmful judicial practices. These harmful approaches contribute to the
continued confusion of school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence; delegitimize constitutional interpretation
in this area; allow possible end runs around the Establishment Clause; harm religious liberty and sanctity; hurt
the administration of the judicial system; and teach anti-democratic principles to citizens and schoolchildren. To
safeguard both sides of Jefferson’s wall, courts must ensure that they comply with justiciability requirements and
the doctrine of hierarchical precedent when asked to classify religious student speech as school-sponsored government
speech or as pure private speech in Establishment Clause cases. This Article’s framework will allow them to do
so.
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“A Court of Justice acting as such . . . does not declare the law eo nomine and in the
abstract, but waits until a case . . . is brought before it judicially involving the point
in dispute: . . . [it] decides only as much of the question at a time as is required by
the case before it, and its decision . . . is drawn from it by the duty which it cannot
refuse to fulfil, of dispensing justice impartially between adverse litigants.”
—John Stuart Mill1
“It is in fact comforting to witness the reality that he who lives by the ipse dixit dies by
the ipse dixit. But one must grieve for the Constitution.”
—Justice Antonin Scalia2

INTRODUCTION
At the start of the public Kountze High School football games, the players
run through large, school-colored banners made by the school’s cheerleaders
with Christian biblical scripture emblazoned upon them.3 The school district
superintendent had once banned these banners due to Establishment Clause
concerns, and the cheerleaders sued claiming violations of their free speech
and free exercise of religion rights notwithstanding the district’s rescission of
the ban.4 In a 2013, nine-sentence order, a Texas trial court found that the
Establishment Clause did not prohibit the display of the religious banners
without identifying the justiciability of this issue, without making any explicit
reference to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
without referencing any case law.5 What followed was five years of confusing,
protracted, and contentious litigation, centering around core disputes as to
whether the banners were private speech or government speech and to what
extent the Establishment Clause might apply.6
1
2
3

4

5
6

JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 403 (H.B. Acton ed., 1972).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Samuel Smith, School District Appeals Texas Cheerleaders’ Bible Verse Case to State Supreme Court,
CHRISTIAN POST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.christianpost.com/news/school-district-appealstexas-cheerleaders-bible-verse-case-to-state-supreme-court.html (showing one banner).
Jim Forsyth, Texas Judge Rules That Cheerleaders May Display Bible Banners, REUTERS (May 8, 2013,
6:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-texas-cheerleaders/texas-judge-rules-thatcheerleaders-may-display-bible-banners-idUSBRE94718W20130508.
Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 2013)
(order granting summary judgment).
See Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2016) (labeling this speech
classification issue a central case dispute).
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In Castroville, Texas, a public high school valedictorian gave a
graduation speech on the school football field in which she prayed in Jesus’s
name and thanked God for his blessings and for the support of the entire
community throughout the week.7 In that week in 2011, a federal district
judge had granted a motion filed by another graduating senior based on the
Establishment Clause—a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)
and preliminary injunction directing the school district to instruct all student
graduation speakers “not to present a prayer” that would “encourage[ ]
others who may not believe in the concept of prayer to join in and believe
the same concept.”8 In an emergency appeal of the order, the Fifth Circuit
dissolved the TRO and injunction with an eight-sentence opinion that stated
the court was “not persuaded that plaintiffs have shown that they are
substantially likely to prevail on the merits, particularly on the issue that the
individual prayers or other remarks to be given by students at graduation are,
in fact, school-sponsored” speech,9 rather than private speech that is not
governed by the Establishment Clause.10 The Fifth Circuit’s order cited
neither the Constitution nor any case law,11 despite the inherent difficulty of
this area of constitutional law.12 During the demagogued and heated
litigation that followed,13 death threats were made against the federal district
judge and his staff.14
Close scrutiny of these two cases yields at least one inarguable precept:
Establishment Clause school law, like all Establishment Clause law, is

7

8
9
10
11
12
13

14

Sonja Harris, Medina Valley HS Class of 2011 and Angela Hildenbrand a Fighting Valedictorian!, TEXAS
GOP VOTE (June 6, 2011, 10:00 AM), https://www.texasgopvote.com/angelahildenbrand/medina-valley-hs-class-2011-and-angela-hildenbrand-fighting-valedictorian-002939.
Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, 2011 WL 13234770, at *2
(W.D. Tex. June 1, 2011).
Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011), available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0005.pdf.
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (noting that the Establishment
Clause applies only to government speech and not private speech).
Schultz, No. 11-50486, at *1–2.
See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 72 (2017) (discussing
the complexity of the Establishment Clause doctrine).
See Andrew Cohen, The Misplaced Indignation of the Judge Who Criticized Obama, ATLANTIC (Apr. 5,
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/the-misplaced-indignation-of-thejudge-who-criticized-obama/255474/ (describing the litigation).
See Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9,
2012), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0001.pdf
(discussing threats).

June 2020]

JUSTICIABILITY AND JUDICIAL FIAT

915

complex.15 Establishment Clause jurisprudence is thicket theory at its very
essence.16 And we should not be surprised by this.17 Establishment Clause
cases are difficult,18 because they involve the core question of the role of
religion in American public life and the essential “meaning of America.”19
The Supreme Court has always acknowledged the close relationship
between religion and American history.20 Yet, it has also established “that
governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious
freedom.”21 The Court has framed these acknowledgments with a Janusian
discourse, stating in Van Orden v. Perry, that “[o]ne face looks to the past in
acknowledgment of our Nation’s heritage, while the other looks to the
present in demanding a separation between church and state.”22 The
dualities that are inherent in the constitutional religion clauses have led the
Court to develop an Establishment Clause doctrine of twists, turns, and so
many tests.23
Despite the division and confusion within Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, three foundational premises are clear. First, justiciability

15

16

17

18

19
20

21
22
23

See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677–78 (1984) (emphasizing the complexity of Establishment
Clause interpretation); Yaseen Eldik & Monica C. Bell, The Establishment Clause and Public Education
in an Islamophobic Era, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 245, 257 (2012) (discussing the difficulties of school
law Establishment Clause analysis).
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION
OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 227–28 (2008) (describing Establishment Clause jurisprudence as almost
incomprehensible); Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693,
693–94 (1997) (highlighting the divisions among scholars and jurists regarding the proper approach
to Establishment Clause analysis).
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“The language of the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment is at best opaque . . . .”); Aaron R. Petty, Accommodating “Religion,” 83 TENN.
L. REV. 529 (2016) (discussing the complexity of religion).
See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of Establishment
Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1230 (2012) (discussing the persistent
tensions that result from Establishment Clause litigation).
Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV.
1, 32 (1998).
See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212 (1963) (noting the close identifications
between religion and American history); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962) (“The history of
man is inseparable from the history of religion.”).
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005).
Id.
See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) (admitting that
the difficulty of Establishment Clause cases has resulted in a “course [that] sacrifices clarity and
predictability for flexibility”).
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requirements prohibit advisory opinions.24 So, to make an Establishment
Clause decision, a court must have a live Establishment Clause case or
controversy between adverse parties with genuinely adverse legal interests.
Second, lower courts are bound by relevant higher-court precedent.25 So, in
Establishment Clause cases, federal circuit courts, federal district courts, and
all state courts are bound by controlling Supreme Court case law. Third, the
Establishment Clause does not apply to private speech; it only applies to
government speech.26 So, if the challenged conduct is private speech, the
Establishment Clause analysis must end.
The question of what has been considered private speech as opposed to
government speech has found significant resonance in school law cases.27 In
the 2000 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe decision, the Court
determined that a pre-football game prayer by a student, which resulted from
mechanisms initiated by the school and was delivered with extensive indicia
of state support, was subject to Establishment Clause analysis as it was schoolsponsored speech, making it government speech and not private speech.28 In
the twenty years since Santa Fe, this pivotal question of how to define allegedly
unconstitutional religious speech as a matter of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has figured prominently in other areas in the school law milieu,
as courts have been tasked with determining potential establishment
violations that attend the display of student-created religious messages on
run-through banners at school sporting events and student-led graduation
invocations.29

24

25
26

27

28
29

See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (labeling the prohibition on advisory opinions as
fundamental to justiciability requirements). But see infra note 103 and accompanying text
(explaining that certain states continue to allow advisory opinions).
See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 713 n.13 (1995) (articulating this binding-precedent
rule).
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion)) (establishing this fundamental speech dichotomy for
school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
See Luke Meier, Using Agency Law to Determine the Boundaries of the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses,
40 IND. L. REV. 519, 526–27 (2007) (discussing how school law has focused on the perplexing
constitutionality of the religious speech of students under the Free Speech Clause and the
Establishment Clause); Anton Sorkin, Graduation Ceremonies: A Prayer for Balancing Sponsorship and
Censorship, 41 S. ILL. U. L.J. 345, 348–49 (2017) (discussing the continued constitutional debate
between “school sponsorship of religion and school censorship of private speech”).
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 309–10.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 3–14.
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These recent school law cases present cautionary tales regarding the
particular and pernicious jurisprudential problems that can occur in the
evaluation of claims that students’ religious speech is private speech, which
takes the dispute out of the ambit of Establishment Clause analysis. Courts
have struggled mightily with these classification issues.30 In this struggle,
some courts have gotten lost in the maze of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and forgotten the core principles of justiciability and binding
precedent.31 Instead, they have resorted to advisory opinions or ipse dixit,
which has only served to make the fundamental Establishment Clause
private speech/government speech dichotomy less clear.32
This Article provides an extended discussion of two of the most egregious
recent examples of these judicial approaches as a vehicle to advocate against
the use of advisory opinions and judicial fiat in student religious-speech
jurisprudence. It then offers a clear foundational framework for the judicial
evaluation of private religious-speech classification claims in school law
establishment cases. This dual-pronged framework consists of a justiciability
requirement and a precedential requirement. First, it requires courts to
ensure the Establishment Clause issue is properly justiciable, which requires
an actual Establishment Clause case or controversy between actually adverse
parties. If the justiciability prerequisite is met, the framework next requires
courts to issue decisions regarding the classification of religious student
speech as private speech or government speech through an express, reasoned
application of the United States Constitution and binding precedent rather
than through mere ipse dixit. A proper application of this framework will
preserve the clarity of the uncontroverted student speech dichotomy in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. And the preservation of any clarity in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is beneficial.

30

31
32

See generally Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 657–58 (2014) (discussing
the environment that might contribute to the lower courts’ struggles in applying the Supreme
Court’s constitutional precedents).
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deeming the
Establishment Clause “a maze”).
See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 605, 607 (2008) (“When a private person speaks, the establishment clause plays no role, but
the free speech clause does. When the government speaks, it is just the reverse: The establishment
clause, but not the free speech clause, applies.”); Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability
of Religious Inequality, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 569, 573 (1996) (discussing judicial confusion as to what
constitutes private student speech versus school-sponsored government speech).
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I. THE COMPLEXITY OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”33 The Supreme Court
has incorporated the Establishment Clause as operative against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.34 The
Establishment Clause is not limited to legislation; it extends to all
governmental action.35 Consequently, all forms of federal or state
governmental conduct,36 including prayer and other religious speech,37 have
the potential to give rise to an Establishment Clause violation.38
Due in part to claims of a deficient rationale for incorporation,39 and in
part to the Supreme Court’s disordered development of this area of First

33
34

35

36

37

38

39

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963) (reaffirming the incorporation
established in Everson v. Bd. of Educ.); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947)
(incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause); Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment Clause
Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 596 (2011) (“[T]here is no chance that Everson’s incorporation
of the clause will be reversed.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the Establishment Clause
Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669, 670 (2013) (discussing the
Due Process Clause’s personal liberty protections as the basis for Everson’s incorporation).
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (“[G]overnment speech must
comport with the Establishment Clause.”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (noting
the Establishment Clause’s application to “legislation or official conduct to determine whether . . .
it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so”).
See Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of the Religion Clauses, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 507 (2006) (identifying how both federal and state governmental action
can implicate the Establishment Clause).
See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005) (“The prohibition on establishment
covers a variety of issues from prayer in widely varying government settings, to financial aid for
religious individuals and institutions, to comment on religious questions.”).
See B. Jessie Hill, (Dis)owning Religious Speech, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 361, 376 (2013) (detailing
how government speech can violate the Establishment Clause); Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government
Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 368–69 (2009) (stating government speech that approves or
disapproves of religion can violate the Establishment Clause).
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678–80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(criticizing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause); EDWARD S. CORWIN, A
CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 114 (1951) (arguing states actually “are entirely
free to establish religions, provided they do not deprive anybody of religious liberty”); William P.
Gray, Jr., The Ten Commandments and the Ten Amendments: A Case Study in Religious Freedom in Alabama,
49 ALA. L. REV. 509, 530 (1998) (arguing that incorporation contravenes the federalist purpose of
the Establishment Clause).
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Amendment jurisprudence,40 Establishment Clause doctrine is “under
perpetual clouds of instability, illegitimacy, and controversy.”41 The Court
has acknowledged the complexity of this area of constitutional interpretation,
emphasizing that the Establishment Clause “is not a precise, detailed
provision in a legal code capable of ready application.”42 Consequently, the
Court has justified its divergent Establishment Clause doctrine by noting that
this analysis cannot be reduced “to a single verbal formulation.”43 The result
of these variances has been that the Court’s approach to analyzing the
Establishment Clause is consistently inconsistent.44
So many tests have been applied when making Establishment Clause
decisions.45 In addition to the infamous Lemon v. Kurtzman test,46 the Supreme
Court, or a portion of it, has applied or called for “almost every plausible
textual, historical, and policy argument” in these cases.47 Adding to the
confusion of this divergent doctrine has been “the bog of concurring and
dissenting opinions, and the opinions that concur in the judgment only, that
40
41

42
43
44

45

46

47

See Fallon, supra note 12, at 60 (“Establishment Clause doctrine is notoriously confused and
disarrayed . . . .”).
Gedicks, supra note 34, at 676; see also Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080
(2019) (plurality opinion) (describing the interpretation of the Establishment Clause as a “vexing
problem”).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984).
Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989).
See John H. Mansfield, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Based Upon or Affecting Religion, 34 SETON HALL
L. REV. 435, 460 (2004) (arguing it is difficult to find consistency in the Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It” The Supreme Court And
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495 (1986) (“[S]ince Everson, the Court has reached results in
establishment cases that are legendary in their inconsistencies.”); Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent
Methodology for First Amendment Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1995)
(arguing that the Court has failed to articulate a “discernible distinction” between government
actions that do and do not violate the Establishment Clause); Paul E. McGreal, Social Capital in
Constitutional Law: The Case of Religious Norm Enforcement Through Prayer at Public Occasions, 40 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 585, 587 (2008) (labeling the “Court’s Establishment Clause holdings . . . ‘inconsistent’”).
See Khaled A. Beydoun, Bisecting American Islam? Divide, Conquer, and Counter-Radicalization, 69
HASTINGS L.J. 429, 486–88 (2018) (discussing the variety of Establishment Clause tests applied by
federal courts).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion[; and]
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”); see also
Michael J. Frank, The Evolving Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and School Vouchers, 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 997, 1009 (2002) (labeling the Lemon test as “infamous”).
Comment, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Religion in the Public Schools, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
73, 88 (1963).
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leave[s one] with the sense [of] walking on unsettled earth.”48 These analyses
and arguments have included the coercion test, the historical approach, the
separation approach, the accommodation perspective, the endorsement test,
the reasonable observer test, the neutrality principle, the non-preferentialist
approach, the non-incorporation approach, a divisiveness analysis, and an
ad hoc approach.49 As a result, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
unfolded in a scattershot and prolonged way.50
Part of the reason for this uneven development is the divergency of
Establishment Clause cases the Court has reviewed.51 The Court has
decided cases involving religious expression in public schools and other
public environments; 52 cases involving the provision of public financial aid
to religious entities;53 and “‘accommodation’ cases in which the government
exempts religious institutions or religiously motivated actors from legal
regulations that otherwise would forbid religiously required or compel
religiously forbidden action.”54 In creating a taxonomy of these cases,
Professor Douglas Laycock has concluded there are “three major lines of
religious liberty cases: funding of religious organizations, regulation of
religious practice, and sponsorship and regulation of religious speech.”55

48
49

50

51

52
53
54
55

Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 903 F.3d 1169, 1184 (11th Cir. 2018) (Royal, J., concurring).
See John M. Bickers, False Facts and Holy War: How the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Cases Fuel
Religious Conflict, 51 IND. L. REV. 305, 307 (2018) (discussing the “troublesome tests” the Court has
employed in developing its Establishment Clause doctrine); William J. Dobosh, Jr., Coercion in the
Ranks: The Establishment Clause Implications of Chaplain-Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WIS.
L. REV. 1493, 1499 (2006) (highlighting the Court’s “convoluted” approach in analyzing the
Establishment Clause); Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 761 (2006) (discussing the nonpreferentialist, nonincorporation, divisiveness,
and ad hoc analyses); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the Religion
Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 361 (1995) (listing the various Establishment Clause tests).
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685 (2005) (discussing the varied approaches in the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)
(noting that the Court had only directly considered the extent of the Establishment Clause eight
times prior to 1963).
See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (highlighting how
different types of Establishment Clause cases require different approaches); Fallon, supra note 12, at
72 (discussing “the existence of distinctive rights or interests to which the Establishment Clause
affords protection, or at least solicitude, of varying degrees”).
DANIEL O. CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 191 (2016).
Id.
Fallon, supra note 12, at 71.
Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes
but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 156 (2004).
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School law has been a fulcrum point within each of these lines of the
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.56 The Court
provided its first extended examination of the Establishment Clause in the
1947 school law case of Everson v. Board of Education,57 which first incorporated
the clause against the states.58 A year later, the first invalidation of a state
governmental practice took place in another school law case, Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education.59 Both of these cases cemented their
establishment analysis in Thomas Jefferson’s interpretation that “the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of
separation between church and State.’”60
Despite this initial uniform application of the Jeffersonian separationist
principle,61 the Court’s subsequent school law Establishment Clause doctrine
has become a legal leviathan in terms of its complexity and its varied analyses
to the multitude of contexts in the special school environment.62 Within all
of this variety, the Court has stated that school law Establishment Clause
jurisprudence consists of “line-drawing, of determining at what point a
dissenter’s rights of religious freedom are infringed by the State.”63 Yet, the
Court has candidly acknowledged that it “can only dimly perceive the lines

56

57

58
59
60

61
62

63

See Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 125
(2000) (“Schools have provided the battleground for some of the most notable Establishment Clause
disputes, which is not surprising, given the special concern for protecting children from religious
establishments.”).
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947); see also Daniel O. Conkle, Toward A General Theory of
the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1124 (1988) (discussing the Court’s first extended
examination of the Establishment Clause in Everson).
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16.
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting 8
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Ford ed. 1904–1905))); see also
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211 (finding an Establishment Clause violation based on an impermissible
intertwinement of state and religion that did not comply with the “wall of separation between
church and State”).
See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212 (“[A]s we said in . . . Everson . . . the First Amendment has erected a
wall between church and State which must be kept high and impregnable.”).
See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Duty of Public Schools to Limit Student-Proposed
Graduation Prayers, 74 NEB. L. REV. 411, 418 (1995) (discussing numerous Establishment Clause
controversies the Court has examined “in myriad educational settings”); Preston C. Green III et
al., Parents Involved, School Assignment Plans, and the Equal Protection Clause: The Case for Special
Constitutional Rules, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 503, 538 (2011) (discussing the intricacies of school law
Establishment Clause doctrine).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
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of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.”64
And so, most school law Establishment Clause cases exist within a space of
controversy as to their proper mode and method of analysis.65
II. CLARITY IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE:
JUSTICIABILITY REQUIREMENTS, THE HIERARCHICAL PRECEDENT
DOCTRINE, AND THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH/PRIVATE SPEECH
DICHOTOMY
A. Justiciability Requirements
What is not at controversy in federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is the requirement of justiciability.66 The Supreme Court has stated that
“[c]oncerns of justiciability go to the power of the federal courts to entertain
disputes, and to the wisdom of their doing so.”67 It is well-settled
constitutional law that federal trial and appellate courts only have the power
to act on justiciable cases or controversies.68
Although they are easy to conflate,69 federal jurisdiction and justiciability
are distinct,70 “in that a court can have jurisdiction to decide a case that turns

64
65

66

67
68

69

70

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 872 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(“The case law that the Supreme Court has heaped on the defenseless text of the establishment
clause is widely acknowledged, even by some Supreme Court Justices, to be formless, unanchored,
subjective and provide no guidance.”); Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After Santa Fe
Independent School District, 90 KY. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (“Religion in public schools has long been a
subject of intense controversy in our country and from all appearances will remain so for a long
time to come.”); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV.
477, 478 (1991) (characterizing the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as “unprincipled,
incoherent, and unworkable”).
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (explaining the basic requirements of a
justiciable controversy); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95–97 (1968) (discussing justiciability
requirements in an Establishment Clause school law case).
Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991).
See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 788 (1969); see also Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172
(2013) (discussing the applicability of the case or controversy requirement to federal trial and
appellate courts).
See Katherine Mims Crocker, Justifying A Prudential Solution to the Williamson County Ripeness Puzzle,
49 GA. L. REV. 163, 201 (2014) (“Courts often treat justiciability as part and parcel of subjectmatter jurisdiction . . . .”).
See Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 493, 529 (2006) (noting the judiciary considers jurisdiction and justiciability as distinct
concepts).
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on nonjusticiability.”71 Article III of the Constitution limits federal court
subject matter jurisdiction to particular types of cases and controversies.72
Because causes are presumed to be outside this limited jurisdiction,73 it is the
role of the complainant to clearly and affirmatively allege facts that properly
invoke federal court jurisdiction.74 Subject matter jurisdiction “can never be
forfeited or waived.”75 Federal appellate courts must consider the question
of proper subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte even if the lower court did not
address it or the parties do not raise it on appeal.76
Justiciability is a “threshold question in every federal case, determining
the power of the court to entertain the suit.”77 Justiciability doctrines are
derived from both the Article III case-or-controversy requirement and from
prudential considerations of judicial administration.78 These doctrines
include standing, prohibition against advisory opinions, mootness, ripeness,
and the political question doctrine.79
With respect to the constitutionally derived limits of justiciability, Article
III requires a live case or controversy between adverse parties that is extant

71
72

73
74

75
76

77
78

79

John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 496 (2017).
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority; —to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State
and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”).
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); William M. Janssen, Remands by
Deception, 81 MO. L. REV. 75, 87 (2016) (discussing limited federal subject matter jurisdiction).
See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n.8 (1986) (stating federal courts will
presume they lack jurisdiction unless the complainant alleges facts that affirmatively show that
jurisdiction).
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“Subject-matter limitations on
federal jurisdiction serve institutional interests. They keep the federal courts within the bounds the
Constitution and Congress have prescribed. Accordingly, subject-matter delineations must be
policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.”).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
See Tommy Tobin, Deciding Not to Decide: Federal Courts’ Discretion to Decline Review and Miller v. City of
Wickliffe, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 709, 713 (2017) (discussing the constitutional and prudential
sources for justiciability).
Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 304 (1996) (listing the
justiciability requirements).
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at the time of the federal judicial decision.80 A live case or controversy is an
actual one.81 The adverse party requirement requires parties with adverse
legal interests, and not necessarily adverse legal arguments.82 These adverse
legal interests must be genuinely adverse.83 An absence of a live controversy
between adverse parties with adverse legal interests should result in a finding
of nonjusticiability, and the court should not make a judicial determination
on, and, instead, should dismiss, that issue.84
Appellate courts should vacate and remand for dismissal any trial court
decisions on nonjusticiable issues.85 “No matter how vehemently the parties
continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that precipitated the
lawsuit,” these judicial actions are required when the dispute “‘is no longer
embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal
rights.’”86 Justiciability cannot be based merely on the parties’ agreement.87

80

81

82
83

84
85

86
87

See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987) (“Article III of the Constitution requires that there
be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case . . . .”); James E.
Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious
Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1359 (2015) (“Scholars and jurists widely accept the proposition
that the federal judicial power can be exercised only when a court is presented with a concrete
dispute between parties possessed of adverse legal interests.”).
See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk,
422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)) (“To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual
controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’”);
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 758 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining the live
controversy requirement is an actual controversy requirement).
See Ann Woolhandler, Adverse Interests and Article III, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1025, 1032–33 (2017)
(discussing this justiciability requirement).
See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (per curiam) (finding “the absence of a
genuine adversary issue between the parties” makes an issue nonjusticiable and “a court may not
safely proceed to judgment” when there is a lack of genuine adversity); Martin H. Redish &
Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the
Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 548 (2006) (“Supreme Court decisions could not be
more certain that Article III is satisfied only when the parties are truly ‘adverse’ to one another
. . . .”).
See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 315 (1991) (stating there is no justiciability when there is an
absence of a live controversy).
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 594 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(providing the appropriate appellate remedy for trial court decisions on nonjusticiable issues); see
also Renne, 501 U.S. at 315 (vacating an appellate court’s judgment and remanding with instructions
to dismiss a nonjusticiable cause of action filed in the trial court).
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quoting Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93
(2009)).
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 964 v. BF Goodrich Aerospace
Aerostructures Grp., 387 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2004).
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If there is no justiciable case or controversy, which means an actual
controversy between actually adverse parties, “the courts have no business
deciding [a dispute], or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”88
This principle reflects Article III limits imposed upon the federal courts89
and the “‘oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability
. . . that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.’”90 An advisory
opinion is an opinion on a matter that does not involve “an actual dispute
between adverse litigants” or an opinion that does not have “a substantial
likelihood that [it] will bring about some change or have some effect.”91
Consequently, a request for an advisory opinion is a request for a judicial
ruling on a nonjusticiable issue.92 Federal cases must retain their “‘character
as a present, live controversy’” between adverse parties in order for courts
“‘to avoid [improper] advisory opinions on abstract questions of law.’”93
The prohibitions on advisory opinions apply to declaratory judgment
actions in constitutional adjudication as well, in that they require “concrete
legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions.”94 For declaratory
judgment actions, this requires that the alleged facts “show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy.”95 The justiciability rules that prohibit advisory
opinions reflect that such claims “are not pressed before the Court with that
clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and
necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every
aspect of a multifaced situation embracing conflicting and demanding
interests.”96 Therefore, there is no justiciable controversy when parties

88
89

90
91
92
93
94
95
96

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006).
See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Of Hats and Robes: Judicial Review of Nonadjudicative Article III Functions, 53 U.
RICH. L. REV. 623, 628 (2019) (placing the prohibition on advisory opinions within the justiciability
requirements that reflect the limitations of Article III).
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 34 (1963)).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.2 (7th ed. 2016).
See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (stating “no justiciable controversy is presented . . . when the parties are
asking for an advisory opinion”).
Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 103 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S.
45, 48 (1969) (per curiam)).
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (quoting United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947)).
Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
Flast, 392 U.S. at 96–97 (quoting United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961)).
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request an advisory opinion.97 Because courts are duty bound to not make
decisions on nonjusticiable matters, appellate courts must consider the
question of whether a lower court issued an impermissible advisory opinion,
like all justiciability questions, sua sponte.98
State courts are not bound by the federal Constitution’s jurisdictional or
Article III case-or-controversy requirements; they are bound by their own
state’s jurisdictional or justiciability requirements,99 “even when they address
issues of federal law.”100 For example, the Texas Supreme Court has
expressly affirmed this for its state courts, finding that Texas law should
determine justiciability issues “as long as applying state law does not defeat
. . . ‘the uncertainly defined obligation of state courts to provide a remedy for
federal wrongs.’”101 In Texas, the state constitution’s Separation of Power
and Open Courts provisions are the bases for the state’s justiciability
doctrine.102 Some states, like Texas, have a prohibition on advisory opinions,
which parallels the federal justiciability doctrine; other states do not have
those prohibitions.103
97
98

99

100
101

102

103

Id. at 95 (“[N]o justiciable controversy is presented when the parties . . . are asking for an advisory
opinion . . . .”).
See United States v. Ramos, 695 F.3d 1035, 1046 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating courts have an
independent duty to examine questions of justiciability “(sua sponte if necessary)”); Canez v.
Guerrero, 707 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating courts have “a duty to consider [justiciability]
sua sponte”); Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The Striking
Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why
We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 110 (2005) (“Courts are required to
address justiciability questions sua sponte regardless of whether the parties do so, and the importance
of these issues increases dramatically when major constitutional issues arise.”); Madeline Fleisher,
Judicial Decision Making Under the Microscope: Moving Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS U. L.
REV. 919, 943 (2008) (“[J]usticiability issues . . . can be brought up sua sponte by judges themselves
even if they are not raised by the parties.”).
See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (“We do not undertake to say that a state
court may not render an opinion on a federal constitutional question even under such
circumstances that it can be regarded only as advisory.”).
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).
Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2001) (quoting 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4023, at 353 (2d ed. 1996)). Texas’s justiciability
requirements must be discussed to establish the foundations for this Article’s Matthews v. Kountze
Independent School District discussion. See infra Part III.A.
See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2012) (citations omitted) (describing
justiciability as “a doctrine rooted in the Separation of Powers provision and the Open Courts
provision of the Texas Constitution”).
See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1833, 1844–46 (2001) (discussing different provisions on state courts and advisory opinions);
Robert M. O’Neil, The Separation of Powers in a Federal System, 37 EMORY L.J. 539, 540 (1988) (“States
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In Texas state courts, like federal courts, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is
essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.”104 Unlike the federal
judicial system, Texas subject matter jurisdiction requires that the case be
justiciable.105 Texas courts must have proper subject matter jurisdiction to
make an adjudication on a matter, and such “jurisdiction is never presumed
and cannot be waived.”106 Also, the question of proper subject matter
jurisdiction must be considered by Texas courts sua sponte.107
Like federal justiciability, Texas justiciability requires that there be a live
controversy between genuinely adverse parties.108 A live controversy is an
actual and real controversy.109 Adverse parties are parties with adverse legal
interests.110 Like federal justiciability doctrine, it is well-settled Texas
justiciability doctrine that there “be a justiciable controversy between the
parties before a declaratory judgment action will lie.”111 So, for a declaratory
judgment action to be justiciable, there must be a “substantial controversy
involving [a] genuine conflict of tangible interests.”112 Consequently, the
Texas Supreme Court has stated that the state Declaratory Judgments Act

104
105
106
107

108

109

110

111
112

such as Alabama, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire empower their courts to render advisory
opinions to the other two branches in circumstances where federal judges clearly would lack a
justiciable case or controversy.”).
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993).
State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted) (“Subject matter
jurisdiction requires . . . that the case be justiciable.”).
Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443–44.
See State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 805 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J., dissenting) (acknowledging “the
judiciary’s sua sponte duty to ensure subject-matter jurisdiction”); Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of
Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 379 (Tex. 2006) (Brister, J., concurring) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction . . .
must be considered by a court sua sponte[.]”); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d
504, 517 n.15 (Tex. 1995) (stating issues related to subject matter jurisdiction “may be raised by an
appellate court sua sponte”).
See Gomez, 891 S.W.2d at 245 (citations omitted) (“Subject matter jurisdiction requires that the party
bringing the suit have standing, that there be a live controversy between the parties, and that the
case be justiciable.”).
See Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 774 (Tex. 2005)
(“Standing to assert a constitutional violation depends on whether the claimant asserts a
particularized, concrete injury.”).
In re Guardianship of DeLuna, 286 S.W.3d 379, 383 (Tex. App. 2008) (citations omitted) (“A
justiciable controversy is one that is definite and concrete and impacts the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests.”).
Cal. Prods., Inc. v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc., 334 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Tex. 1960).
Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Bexar-Medina-Atascosa
Counties Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Medina Lake Prot. Ass’n, 640 S.W.2d 778,
779–80 (Tex. App. 1982)).
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“does not license litigants to fish in judicial ponds for legal advice.”113
Nonjusticiable issues should be dismissed by Texas trial courts.114 When an
appellate court finds that there was a decision made on a nonjusticiable issue
in the trial court, the remedy is to vacate any previously issued orders or
judgments and dismiss the case.115
If a Texas district court decides a matter without the justiciable
requirement of a live controversy, “then its decision would not bind the
parties.”116 Such a decision is a prohibited advisory opinion that violates the
state’s constitutional separation of powers doctrine that allocates the issuance
of advisory opinions to “the executive rather than the judicial
department.”117 Like in federal jurisprudence, Texas courts are barred from
issuing advisory opinions in all cases, including in response to requests for
declaratory judgment.118 Finally, like federal courts, because Texas courts
are duty bound to not make decisions on nonjusticiable matters, state
appellate courts must consider the question of whether a lower court issued
an impermissible advisory opinion, like all justiciability questions, sua
sponte.119
B. The Hierarchical Precedent Doctrine
What is not at controversy in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that
lower courts are bound by relevant precedent from controlling higher

113
114
115

116
117
118

119

Cal. Prods., Inc., 334 S.W.2d at 781 (quoting WALTER H. ANDERSON, 1 DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS 47 (2d ed. 1951)).
See Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246, 250 (Tex. 2018) (holding that the
trial court properly dismissed a nonjusticiable claim), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1344 (2019).
See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012) (“If a case is or becomes moot,
the court must vacate any order or judgment previously issued and dismiss the case for want of
jurisdiction.”).
State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted).
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (citing TEX. CONST.
art. II, § 1).
See id. (citations omitted) (interpreting the state Declaratory Judgment Act “to be merely a
procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction rather than a legislative
enlargement of a court’s power, permitting the rendition of advisory opinions”).
See Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC, 556 S.W.3d at 260 (“[J]usticiability [is] a jurisdictional matter.
Thus, it may be raised at any time or by the court sua sponte.”); see also Farmers Tex. Cty. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (stating that justiciability issues must be
raised sua sponte); Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287, 302 n.63 (Tex. App. 2018)
(discussing an “obligat[ion] to consider these justiciability issues sua sponte”).
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courts.120 Consequently, when a higher court has already decided an issue,
a lower court has no discretion to ignore that precedent.121 This has been
deemed the “the doctrine of hierarchical precedent,” “the binding precedent
rule,” or “vertical stare decisis.”122 This is a foundational principle of the
American judicial system.123
Under the rule of hierarchical precedent and the Supremacy Clause’s
provision that the “Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land,”124 all lower federal courts and all state courts are bound by the
Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions.125 Although state courts are not
bound by federal rules of justiciability, they are bound by the Supreme
Court’s constitutional precedent when they adjudicate federal constitutional
issues.126 Consequently, all courts must follow the constitutional precedents
established by the Supreme Court “until [the Court] sees fit to reexamine

120

121
122

123

124
125
126

See Johnson v. DeSoto Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 72 F.3d 1556, 1559 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing
the requirements of the binding precedent rule); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The
Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 969
(2000) (discussing the Court’s insistence that lower courts apply direct precedent even where it
seems like it may be overruled); Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 422 (1992) (“Few would dispute
that lower courts must follow the decisions of the Supreme Court.”).
See Johnson, 72 F.3d at 1559 n.2 (“The binding precedent rule affords a court no such discretion
where a higher court has already decided the issue before it.”).
See id. (using the term “binding precedent rule”); see also Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 819 (1994) (using the label “the doctrine of
hierarchical precedent”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy
and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1609 (1995) (footnote omitted) (stating
federal courts “adhere to . . . strict vertical precedent”); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty,
and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1454 (2007) (“Vertical stare decisis refers to the binding
effect of precedent on lower courts.”); Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United
States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 790 (2012) (using the term “vertical stare decisis”); Frederick Schauer, Has
Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 385 (2007) (employing
the term “vertical precedent”).
See Caminker, supra note 122, at 818 (discussing the “longstanding doctrine” of hierarchical
precedent in the American judicial system); see also Amy J. Griffin, Dethroning the Hierarchy of Authority,
97 OR. L. REV. 51, 59–60 (2018) (labeling vertical precedent as “the strongest form of judicial
authority”).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 713 n.13 (1995) (stating all lower courts must adhere
to Supreme Court precedent).
See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound
by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they
address issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution[.]”).
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[them].”127 This hierarchical precedent rule of American constitutional law
“is indefeasible and absolute.”128
C. The Establishment Clause Government Speech/Private Speech Dichotomy
Finally, what is not at controversy in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is that the clause only applies to government speech;129 it does not apply to
private speech.130 In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Supreme
Court cemented this fundamental dichotomy into its school law doctrine.131
Here, the Court determined at the outset of the opinion that “there is a
crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”132 All of the Justices,
even the dissenters, agreed with this principle.133 Because this Santa Fe
crucial-difference principle is a core “remarkable consistency” in case law
regarding religious speech in public schools, it merits close discussion.134
The Supreme Court examined the Establishment Clause and student
prayers at public high school football games in Santa Fe.135 In this case, a

127
128
129

130

131

132
133
134
135

1B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.402[1], at I–10 (2d ed. 1996).
Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1843, 1850 (2013).
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (providing that a key restraint on
government speech, but not private speech, is that it “must comport with the Establishment
Clause”).
See Perry O. Chrisman, Confessions of a Baptist Lawyer, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1996)
(stating there is no Establishment Clause application to “purely private speech”); see also Steven G.
Gey, When is Religious Speech not “Free Speech”?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 383 (2000) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s repeated acknowledgments that the Establishment Clause does not apply to
private speech); Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85 TUL. L.
REV. 571, 577 (2011) (“[P]rivate speech by itself does not present any Establishment Clause
concerns.”).
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (invalidating a public school’s policy
of allowing a student-led prayer over the public address system on the grounds that it “establishes
an improper majoritarian election on religion”).
Id. at 302 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)
(plurality opinion)).
See id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing the difference between how the Constitution
treats government speech and private speech endorsing religion).
Laycock, supra note 55, at 218.
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 (reasoning that by incorporating prayer into a “school-related procedure,
which entrusts the inherently nongovernmental subject of religion to a majoritarian vote, a
constitutional violation has occurred”).
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Mormon student and a Catholic student, with their mothers, claimed their
public school district violated the Establishment Clause by “allow[ing]
students to read Christian invocations and benedictions from the stage at
graduation ceremonies, and to deliver overtly Christian prayers over the
public address system at home football games.”136 The Court granted review
only as to the football game prayer policy.137 This left the question of
whether state policies and practices regarding student invocations at public
school graduations were violative of the Establishment Clause open for future
judicial resolution.138
In Santa Fe, the Court determined the school’s pre-game invocation policy
violated the Establishment Clause.139 In doing so, the Court first highlighted
the important role of public worship and prayer in many American
communities.140 The Court stressed that the religion clauses of the First
Amendment do not prohibit all religious activities in American public schools
as the clauses’ purposes were the security of religious liberty.141 However,
the Court emphasized that “religious activity in public schools, as elsewhere,
must comport with the First Amendment”142 and that this policy did not do
so.143
The policy at issue provided:
The board has chosen to permit students to deliver a brief invocation
and/or message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home

136
137
138

139
140

141
142
143

Id. at 295.
See id. at 301 (limiting the grant of certiorari to the question of student-led and student-initiated
prayer at football games).
This has not been resolved. See Steven K. Green, All Things Not Being Equal: Reconciling Student Religious
Expression in the Public Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 843, 873 (2009) (discussing the inconsistences
in the federal courts’ treatment of student prayers at school graduations); see also Bruce Ledewitz,
Toward a Meaning-Full Establishment Clause Neutrality, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 764 (2012)
(discussing multiple controversies regarding student prayers at public school graduations); Myron
Schreck, Balancing the Right to Pray at Graduation and the Responsibility of Disestablishment, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1869, 1869 (1995) (discussing “the battle over [student] prayer at public school graduation
ceremonies”).
See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 316 (reasoning that the policy created the perception of school endorsement
of a religious practice).
See id. at 307 (“We recognize the important role that public worship plays in many communities, as
well as the sincere desire to include public prayer as a part of various occasions so as to mark those
occasions’ significance.”).
See id. at 313 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (stating that “the common purpose
of the Religion Clauses ‘is to secure religious liberty.’”).
Id. at 307.
See id. at 316 (explaining that the school’s policy was unconstitutional because “it impermissibly
impose[d] upon the student body a majoritarian election on the issue of prayer”).
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varsity football games to solemnize the event, to promote good
sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the appropriate
environment for the competition. Upon advice and direction of the high
school principal, each spring, the high school student council shall conduct
an election, by the high school student body, by secret ballot, to determine
whether such a statement or invocation will be a part of the pre-game
ceremonies and if so, shall elect a student, from a list of student volunteers,
to deliver the statement or invocation. The student volunteer who is selected
by his or her classmates may decide what message and/or invocation to
deliver, consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy. If the District
is enjoined by a court order from the enforcement of this policy, then and
only then will the following policy automatically become the applicable
policy of the school district. The board has chosen to permit students to
deliver a brief invocation and/or message to be delivered during the pregame ceremonies of home varsity football games to solemnize the event, to
promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the
appropriate environment for the competition. Upon advice and direction of
the high school principal, each spring, the high school student council shall
conduct an election, by the high school student body, by secret ballot, to
determine whether such a message or invocation will be a part of the pregame ceremonies and if so, shall elect a student, from a list of student
volunteers, to deliver the statement or invocation. The student volunteer
who is selected by his or her classmates may decide what statement or
invocation to deliver, consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy.
Any message and/or invocation delivered by a student must be nonsectarian
and nonproselytizing.144

This final reviewed policy was a slight modification of a previous school
district policy that was “titled ‘Prayer at Football Games’” and that originally
used only the term “invocations,” rather than the terms “invocation,”
“messages,” and “statements.”145
In conducting its review of this policy, the Court first dismissed the state’s
claims that the invocations were “private student speech” that was not
subject to the constraints of the Establishment Clause.146 Here, the Court
rejected the state’s argument that the dual student elections for approval of
the invocations at the games and for the invocation student speaker turned
the public speech into private speech, which would insulate the school from
a finding of unconstitutional coercion.147 In doing so, the Court made clear
144
145
146
147

Id. at 298–99 n.6 (citation omitted).
Id. at 298, 309.
Id. at 302.
See id. at 305, 310 (reasoning that despite the school’s assertion that it employed a “hands-off”
approach to the pregame prayer, the policy reveals both perceived and actual endorsement of
religion).
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that the Establishment Clause does not apply to private student speech,
explicitly agreeing with a previous equal access decision that only
government speech is constrained by the Establishment Clause.148
The clarity of the Santa Fe crucial distinction between government speech
and private speech in school law jurisprudence was mere prologue to a rather
complex framework for the constitutional classification of the students’
religious speech, as being subject to the Establishment Clause. The jumpingoff point in this analysis was the finding that the invocations were “authorized
by a government policy . . . .”149 The students’ prayers were delivered “on
government property at government-sponsored school-related events . . .
over the school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the student
body, under the supervision of school faculty . . . .”150 These factors all
supported the Court’s conclusion these invocations could not be classified as
private speech.
Additionally, the Court found these prayers did not take place within a
government-created limited public forum that would allow them to be
considered private speech, as there was no policy or practice evidence that
the school officials had “any intent to open the [pregame ceremony] to
‘indiscriminate use,’ . . . by the student body generally.”151 Instead, the
school engaged in a selective access process, where the same student each
football season delivered the invocation.152 The resulting invocation was
“subject to particular regulations that confine[d] the content and topic of the
student’s message.”153 The Court determined this selective access approach
and regulated student messaging countervailed the governmental claims of
the creation of a protected public forum that would create a private speech
zone for the student’s invocation.154
Also determinative to the Court’s conclusion that the pre-game student
prayer was not private speech was the finding that the selection of the student
invocation giver was the result of a state-initiated process.155 Here, the Court
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

See id. at 302 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion)).
Id.
Id. at 302, 310.
Id. at 303 (alterations in original) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270
(1988)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
See id. at 303–04 (referring to Santa Fe’s student election system).
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rejected the state’s arguments that it had taken a “‘hands-off’ approach to
the pregame invocation” and that the “individual student [was] the ‘circuitbreaker’ in the process,” which transformed the invocation into private
speech.156 Essentially, the Court found that the state created the circuit; it
created the invocation and student selection process by initiating the dual
elections with its policy.157 The school’s initiation of and extensive
entanglement in this process revealed “the ‘degree of school involvement’
[that made] it clear that the pregame prayers [bore] ‘the imprint of the State
and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable position.’”158
Another basis for the Court’s determination that the invocations were not
private speech was that the state-initiated selection mechanism was a
majoritarian one, which “ensure[d] that only those messages deemed
‘appropriate’ under the District’s policy may be delivered.”159 Consequently,
the state could no longer claim that these invocations were pure private
speech. Further, the state-initiated majoritarian mechanisms made access to
the forum dependent upon majoritarian consent.160 Because “‘[a]ccess to a
public forum . . . does not depend upon majoritarian consent,’”161 there was
no such public forum for private speech during this pregame ceremony.162
These majoritarian-controlled systems were constitutionally problematic
because they provided insufficient safeguards for minority speakers and for
diversity of speech.163 The Court found that “the majoritarian process
implemented by the District guarantees, by definition, that minority
candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively
silenced.”164 These student elections did “nothing to protect minority views
but rather place[d] the students who hold such views at the mercy of the

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

164

Id. at 305 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 305–06 (supporting the conclusion that the student prayer was not private speech).
Id. at 305 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)).
Id. at 304.
See id. (“[T]his student election does nothing to protect minority views but rather places the students
who hold such views at the mercy of the majority.”).
Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)).
Id. at 304–05.
Id. Protection of the minority was especially relevant to the case. One month into these
constitutional proceedings, the district court had to enter an all-caps-inclusive protective order
allowing the student plaintiffs to proceed anonymously as a measure to keep them safe “from
intimidation or harassment.” Id. at 294, 294 n.1.
Id. at 304.
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majority.”165 All of these findings regarding the majoritarian-controlled
aspects of the state-initiated student invocation supported the Court’s
conclusion that the invocations were not subject to protection from the
requirements of the Establishment Clause as private speech.166
In addition to the school’s involvement in the speaker selection process,
the Court also found the express and implied terms of the school district
policy, its history, and its actual purpose “invite[d] and encourage[d]
religious messages” of the students in order to classify these invocations as
non-private speech.167 The Court emphasized the only expressly endorsed
message in the policy was “an ‘invocation’—a term that primarily describes
an appeal for divine assistance.”168 In the history of the high school, an
invocation had always been “a focused religious message.”169 As a result, the
Court concluded that “the expressed purposes of the policy encourage[d] the
selection of a religious message [specifically prayer], and that is precisely how
the students underst[ood] the policy.”170 It also found that the express policy
purpose, “to solemnize the event,” was most obviously accomplished through
a religious message.171 Therefore, the express and implied terms, the history,
and the purpose of the policy indicated state support of the student
invocations, which contributed to the Court’s rejection of the state’s claim
that these invocations were private speech.
Beyond the student speaker selection process and the policy’s text,
additional factual factors established “[t]he actual or perceived endorsement
of the message” by the school, which supported the Court’s conclusion that
the invocations were not private speech.172 These factors included:
Once the student speaker is selected and the message composed, the
invocation is then delivered to a large audience assembled as part of a
regularly scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on school
property. The message is broadcast over the school’s public address system,
which remains subject to the control of school officials. It is fair to assume
that the pregame ceremony is clothed in the traditional indicia of school
sporting events, which generally include not just the team, but also

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Id.
See id. at 304–06.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 307.
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cheerleaders and band members dressed in uniforms sporting the school
name and mascot. The school’s name is likely written in large print across
the field and on banners and flags. The crowd will certainly include many
who display the school colors and insignia on their school T-shirts, jackets,
or hats and who may also be waving signs displaying the school name.173

The Court found the combination of these factors would lead an objective
high school student to “unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame
prayer as stamped with [the] school’s seal of approval.”174
This objective student’s perception that the school encouraged the prayer
was reinforced by the history, text, and actual purposes of the policy.175 The
Court found that, while there is some judicial deference owed to a state’s
characterization of the purpose for a religious policy, “it is nonetheless the
duty of the courts to ‘distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from a sincere
one.’”176 Here, the Court refused to give deference to the state’s asserted
secular purposes of the policy—to “foste[r] free expression of private
persons[,] . . . to solemniz[e] the event, to promot[e] good sportsmanship
and student safety, and to establis[h] the appropriate environment for the
competition,”177 because these purposes were not furthered when only one
student was “permitted to give a content-limited message” and the message
was “prayer sponsored by the school.”178 The Court also emphasized that
the name of the original policy, “Prayer at Football Games,” demonstrated
that the specific purpose of the policy was not a secular purpose; it “was to
preserve a popular ‘state-sponsored religious practice.’”179 This schoolsponsored religious speech was not permissible under the Establishment
Clause because it created a schism between schoolchildren, “send[ing] the
ancillary message to members of the audience who are non-adherents ‘that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community.’”180
173
174
175

176
177
178
179
180

Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 308.
See id. (“In this context the members of the listening audience must perceive the pregame message
as a public expression of the views of the majority of the student body delivered with the approval
of the school administration.”).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O’Connor, J.
concurring)).
Id. at 306, 309 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at 309.
Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
Id. at 309–10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J. concurring)).
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As a result of these extensive findings, the Court concluded the student
invocations under the policy were not private speech.181 In summarizing this
conclusion, the Court stated that “[t]he delivery of such a message—over the
school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the student body,
under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that
explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer—is not properly
characterized as ‘private’ speech.”182
The dissent disagreed with this private-speech conclusion.183 Its analysis
was brief.184 It consisted of two sentences: “Here, by contrast, the potential
speech at issue, if the policy had been allowed to proceed, would be a message
or invocation selected or created by a student. That is, if there were speech
at issue here, it would be private speech.”185
After determining the student prayer was not private speech, the Court’s
majority opinion applied a substantive coercion analysis to determine the
invocation policy violated the Establishment Clause.186 The Court first
found unconstitutional governmental coercion because the district policy
created elections to determine if the pre-football game ceremony would
feature religious messages, which “encourage[d] divisiveness along religious
lines in a public school setting.”187 Next, the Court dismissed the state’s
argument of the absence of coercion because attendance at an
extracurricular football game is voluntary based on the compulsory football
game attendance requirements for certain students and the social conformity
pressures on all high school students.188 Here, the Court stated that “the
State cannot [constitutionally] require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her
rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored
religious practice.”189 Based on these findings, the Court concluded “that the
delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those

181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 310.
Id.
See id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the speech at issue would have been private
speech rather than government speech).
See id. (disposing of whether the potential speech was private in a short paragraph).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 310 (majority opinion).
Id. at 311.
See id. at 311–12 (“For many . . . the choice between attending these games and avoiding personally
offensive religious rituals is in no practical sense an easy one.”)
Id. at 312 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
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present to participate in an act of religious worship,”190 especially in a
community that included non-adherent children who merit vigilant
constitutional protection.191 Therefore, the Court found an Establishment
Clause violation by this policy and the coercion that resulted from it because
“the religious liberty protected by the Constitution is abridged when the State
affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.”192
The final portion of the opinion dealt with the school district’s claim that
the plaintiffs had made a premature facial challenge to the policy that must
fail, because no student had delivered an invocation under that policy and
there was “no certainty that any of the statements or invocations [under the
policy] will be religious.”193 The Court dismissed this argument, stating that
it was not just concerned with the constitutional injury that would result from
“a student [being] forced to participate in an act of religious worship because
she chooses to attend a school event.”194 It was also concerned with the two
constitutional injuries that were presented in this facial challenge: 1) “the
mere passage by the District of a policy that has the purpose and perception
of government establishment of religion” and 2) “the implementation of a
governmental electoral process that subjects the issue of prayer to a
majoritarian vote.”195 With respect to this first issue, the Court reiterated
that the text of the policy revealed its “unconstitutional purpose,” which
required its invalidation under the “secular legislative purpose” requirement
of the first prong of the Lemon test.196 Beyond the text of the policy, the Court
found the context in which that policy was implemented clearly
demonstrated “the purpose of endorsing school prayer.”197 As a result, the
Court concluded that “the simple enactment of this policy, with the purpose
and perception of school endorsement of student prayer, was a constitutional
violation.”198
With respect to the second issue, the Court found “[t]his policy likewise
[did] not survive a facial challenge because it impermissibly impose[d] upon
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id.
Id.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 315 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
Id.
Id. at 316.
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the student body a majoritarian election on the issue of prayer.”199 The
policy’s empowerment of the “student body majority with the authority to
subject students of minority views to constitutionally improper messages” in
the form of school-sponsored prayer was a violation of the Establishment
Clause.200 Therefore, being mindful of “the myriad, subtle ways in which
Establishment Clause values can be eroded,” the Supreme Court concluded
that the policy was an impermissible violation of that clause.201
Santa Fe is the seminal case on the classification of student religious speech
within Establishment Clause jurisprudence.202 It makes clear the crucial
difference in school law between private speech, which is not governed by
the Establishment Clause, and government speech, which is constrained by
that clause.203 Yet, in its extended analysis of this principle, the Court does
not provide a complete, concise articulation of the precise method for this
type of religious-speech classification.
Courts have struggled to accomplish this classification task in
Establishment Clause cases that have been litigated since Santa Fe,204
demonstrating that “[n]o matter how clearly stated a distinction is in theory,
it will become complex and tangled in practice.”205 This area has become a
particular point of contention in litigation involving student religious
speech.206 Therefore, despite the clarity of the Santa Fe speech dichotomy,
confusion persists within school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence

199
200
201
202
203

204

205
206

Id.
Id.
Id. at 314, 316 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
See Meier, supra note 27, at 521 (identifying Santa Fe as the key case for distinguishing private speech
versus government speech for religious student speech).
See Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing Something?, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2002) (characterizing the Santa Fe private speech/government speech
dichotomy as an uncontroverted principle at the core of the Court’s school law jurisprudence).
See generally Hillel Y. Levin et al., To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the State Regulate
Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and Third Parties?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915, 992 (2016)
(discussing how courts and the country are still trying to resolve “a difficult question: When a
religious practice imposes costs and risks on third parties, how can we tell whether tolerance of that
practice violates the Establishment Clause?”).
Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 38 (2005).
See Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of Free Speech and
Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 386–87 (2004) (discussing divergent judicial
approaches to the classification of religious student speech in Establishment Clause and free exercise
cases).
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regarding the proper way to classify student religious speech as either
government speech or private speech.207
III. CONTINUED CONFUSION IN SCHOOL LAW ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
In the twenty years since the Santa Fe decision, the classification of student
religious speech has become an analytical battlefield in school law
Establishment Clause cases. When addressed with this precise issue, courts
have been inconsistent in their modes and methods of analysis.208 This
continued confusion has been particularly apparent in constitutional
litigation involving the display of students’ religious messages at school
sporting events and student-led graduation invocations. Two of these cases,
Matthews v. Kountze Independent School District and Schultz v. Medina Valley
Independent School District, are paradigmatic examples of the problems of
nonjusticiability and judicial fiat in this area of First Amendment school law.
Like Santa Fe, both cases centered around students’ religious speech on Texas
high school football fields.209

207

208

209

See Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 30 (2009)
(discussing the confusion in school law in classifying religious student speech); see also Brady, supra
note 203, at 1152 (stating that most disputed Establishment Clause school law cases involve the
“grey area” of student religious speech).
This tracks with other areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 104 n.151
(1991) (referencing the inconsistencies of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence);
Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 790
n.55 (2007) (mentioning the inconsistency of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence); David M. Smolin, The Religious Root and Branch of Anti-Abortion Lawlessness, 47 BAYLOR
L. REV. 119, 142 (1995) (“The specific holdings of the Court interpreting the Establishment Clause
have been so inconsistent that most commentators long ago stopped trying to reconcile the cases.”).
See Joe Dryden, The Religious Viewpoint Antidiscrimination Act: Using Students as Surrogates to Subjugate the
Establishment Clause, 82 MISS. L.J. 127, 135 (2013) (“Texas . . . is no stranger to Establishment Clause
litigation . . . .”). Indeed, “[e]verything is bigger in Texas,” including, apparently, litigation
involving the application of the Establishment Clause to student religious speech. Hall v. McRaven,
508 S.W.3d 232, 245 (Tex. 2017) (Willett, J., concurring).
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A. The Establishment Clause and Student-Created Religious Messages at School
Sporting Events: The Justiciability Saga of Matthews v. Kountze Independent
School District
Although the Supreme Court’s Santa Fe decision established a strong
precedent regarding the classification of school-sponsored student
invocations at high school football games as government speech that violates
the Establishment Clause,210 an ancillary issue has arisen regarding the
display of student-created religious messages at public school sporting events.
One such dispute originated at a public high school in Kountze, Texas,
which is about 100 miles away from Santa Fe, Texas.211 However, unlike
Santa Fe, this case was litigated in the state courts; it involved cheerleadercreated religious displays on the run-through banners at football games; it
was brought by students against the school district not for sponsoring the
religious speech, but for restricting it; and its petition alleged violations of the
cheerleaders’ First Amendment rights of free speech and free exercise of
religion, rather than a claimed Establishment Clause violation.212 And yet,
the trial court’s impermissible advisory opinion—that the Establishment
Clause did not prohibit the display of the religious banners without making
any express determination as to whether the banners constituted government
speech or private speech—initiated six years of intense and protracted
litigation.213
1. The Trial Court Proceedings
In Matthews v. Kountze Independent School District, the parents of student
cheerleaders brought suit on behalf of their children against the school
district and its superintendent after the superintendent “prohibited the
Cheerleaders from including religious messages on run-through banners
used at the beginning of high school football games” during the 2012 football
210
211

212
213

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302, 316 (2000).
Emma Green, Cheerleaders for Christ, ATLANTIC (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/04/kountze-cheerleaders-free-speech-religion-banners-football/476892/
(discussing the Matthews litigation); Driving Directions from Santa Fe, TX to Kountze, TX,
GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point
field for “Santa Fe, TX” and search destination field for “Kountze, TX”).
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex. rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 124–26 (Tex. App.
2014).
Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796, at 2 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8,
2013).
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season.214 These run-through banners had been made for a number of years
by the high school cheerleading squad for varsity football games.215 The
large banners were displayed by the squad on the school field for the football
team to charge through at the start of each game.216 The content of the
banners was decided by the entire squad.217 To make sure the banners were
appropriate for the game and did not have poor sportsmanship, they were
reviewed and approved by the squad’s school sponsors.218 For the 2012
football season, the cheerleading squad used biblical scripture and Christian
symbols on the run-through banners.219
On September 18, 2012, one day after receiving complaints from the
Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) that the banners violated the
Establishment Clause and then seeking legal advice, the district
superintendent informed the district principals that the banners could no
longer include religious messages.220 On that same day, the new policy was
announced on the high school’s intercom by a campus administrator.221 The
superintendent instituted this new policy without first consulting the district’s
Board of Trustees.222
On September 20, 2012, some of the high school cheerleaders, some
middle school cheerleaders, and their families filed suit in Texas state court,
alleging this policy violated the students’ constitutional rights to free speech
and free exercise.223 The plaintiffs filed an application for a TRO and a
request for injunctive relief with their petition.224 The state trial court
granted the plaintiffs’ TRO request and ordered the school district and
214

215
216
217
218
219
220

221
222
223

224

Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2017 WL 4319908,
at *1, *1 n.1 (Tex. App. Sept. 28, 2017). Hereinafter, the plaintiffs in this action will be referred to
as “the cheerleaders” for the sake of brevity.
Matthews, 482 S.W.3d at 124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 125. The court explained that “FFRF identifies itself as a ‘watchdog organization’ and
appears to regularly send letters to federal, state, and local government officials objecting to
activities that they believe violate the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 125 n.3.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 123, 124 n.2, 125 (describing the high school litigants and discussing the similar middle school
run-through banners practice); Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d
416, 417 (Tex. 2016) (referencing the middle school litigants).
Matthews, 482 S.W.3d at 125.
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superintendent “to cease and desist from preventing the cheerleaders of
Kountze Independent School District (“KISD”) from displaying banners or
run throughs at sporting events and/or censoring the sentiments expressed
thereon.”225
Thereafter, the school district filed a plea to the district court’s
jurisdiction based on governmental immunity and lack of standing.226 A plea
to the jurisdiction in Texas is a challenge to the trial court’s “authority to
decide a case on the merits.”227 For a court to have authority to decide a
case against a government entity on the merits, the plaintiff must prove a
valid waiver of immunity from suit because governmental immunity deprives
trial courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.228
On October 16, 2012, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott filed a
petition to intervene in the case in support of the cheerleaders.229 On that
same day, the school district conducted community legislative proceedings
regarding the superintendent’s banners policy.230 The next day, Abbott and
Governor Rick Perry gave a press conference expressing their complete
support for the cheerleaders.231
In this press conference, Abbott
characterized the banners as “student-led expression . . . that’s perfectly
constitutional.”232 He continued, “We will not allow atheist groups from
outside the state of Texas to come into the state to use menacing and
misleading and intimidating tactics to try to bully schools to bow down to the
altar of secular beliefs.”233 Governor Perry stated, “We’re a nation built on
the concept of free expression of ideas. We’re also a culture built on the

225
226
227
228
229

230
231

232
233

Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2012 WL 5269957, at 3 (Tex.
Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2012).
Matthews, 484 S.W.3d at 417.
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2017 WL 4319908,
at *2 (Tex. App. Sept. 28, 2017) (citation omitted).
Id.
Amy Moore, Cheerleaders Have Texas AG, Governor in Their Corner for Today’s Hearing, BEAUMONT
ENTER. (Oct. 18, 2012, 8:21 AM), https://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/
Cheerleaders-have-Texas-AG-Governor-in-their-3956566.php.
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex. rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 127 (Tex. App. 2014).
Chris Tomlinson, Texas AG Intervenes in Cheerleader Banner Dispute, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Oct. 17,
2012, 5:34 PM), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2012/oct/17/texas-ag-intervenes-in-cheer
leader-banner-dispute/.
Id.
Id.
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concept that the original law is God’s law, outlined in the Ten
Commandments.”234
One day after the press conference, on October 18, 2012, the trial court
determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to a temporary injunction.”235 In
this order, the court found the constitutional claims presented a substantial
threat of irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief.236 Specifically,
the court found that, without injunctive relief, “the Defendants’ unlawful
policy prohibiting private religious expression will remain in effect and the
Plaintiffs will be prohibited from exercising their constitutional . . . rights at
football games and other school sporting events.”237 This language, with the
express inclusion of the terms “private religious expression,” would later be
claimed by the cheerleaders to be the trial court’s classification of the student
speech as “private speech, not government speech.”238 The injunction
permitted the cheerleaders to display their religious run-through banners at
the school football games for the remainder of the 2012 season.239
On April 8, 2013, the school district’s Board of Trustees adopted a new
policy that allowed the cheerleaders to display the religious run-through
banners.240 This new formal district policy provided “that school personnel
are not required to prohibit messages on school banners, including runthrough banners, that display fleeting expressions of community sentiment
solely because the source or origin of such messages is religious.”241
Thereafter, the school district supplemented its plea to the trial court’s
jurisdiction to assert mootness based on the adoption of the new policy.242
After this supplemented plea and throughout the cheerleaders’ free
speech and free exercise litigation, the school district urged the court for a
determination as to the applicability of the Establishment Clause on the
school district’s policy. The school district made multiple judicial admissions
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Id.
Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2012 WL 5269957, at 3 (Tex.
Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2012).
Id. at 4.
Id.
Reply Brief of Petitioners at 20, Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d
416 (Tex. 2016) (No. 14-0453), 2015 WL 10321932, at *20.
Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796, at 1 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8,
2013).
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 127 (Tex. App. 2014).
Id. (quoting the resolution adopted by the Kountze ISD Board of Trustees).
Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. 2016).
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that it affirmed the April 8 policy and that it had no current or future
intentions to ban religious messages on the run-through banners,243 so long
as the Establishment Clause did not prohibit the school district from doing
so.244 From the time of the filing of its first amended answer and through its
filings in support of its request for declaratory relief, the school district
repeatedly requested the court issue a ruling that the district’s allowance of
the cheerleaders’ religiously themed run-through banners at the football
games did not violate the Establishment Clause.245
For example, in its October 12, 2012, motion for preliminary declaratory
relief, the school district sought a judicial determination “that the
Establishment Clause should not be interpreted so as to require Defendants
to bar the religious banners at issue in this case.”246 It offered three
arguments in support of this requested relief:
1.

2.

3.

There is evidence in the record that the application of Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), to the
religiously themed run-through banners at Kountze High School
has created the impression that Defendants are hostile to religion;
Establishment Clause decisions requiring the exclusion of religion
from public life should be narrowly construed or reconsidered
because they originated in anti-religious sentiment and depart from
the original understanding of the Establishment Clause; and
The Kountze High School run-through banners, including those
with religiously themed messages, serve legitimate, nonreligious,
secular purposes.247

Under the first heading of this request for declaratory relief, the school
district asked the court for a classification of the cheerleaders’ banner as

243
244

245
246
247

Matthews, 482 S.W.3d at 127–28.
See Kountze ISD’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment of
Kountze ISD Regarding Its Request for Declaratory Relief at 1–3, Matthews ex rel. Matthews v.
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 2013), 2013 WL 2299644, at *1–3
(requesting the Court to clearly state that the cheerleading squad could display religious banners
without violating the Establishment Clause).
Id. at 1–2.
Defendants’ Motion for Preliminary Declaratory Relief at 1, Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch.
Dist., No. 53526 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 2013), 2012 WL 8203195, at *1.
Id. at 1–2.
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government speech for Establishment Clause purposes.248 The net result of
this motion was a request for an impermissible advisory opinion.249
Because the cheerleaders wanted the same judicial finding on the
Establishment Clause issue, they were not adverse parties to the school
district on that issue. In their motion for partial summary judgment, the
cheerleaders sought a similar determination by the trial court that the school
district “violates no law by allowing the Cheerleaders to display religious
messages on their run-through banners.”250 A judicial determination of “no
law” violation would indicate this type of allowance does not violate the
Establishment Clause.251
In their April 29, 2013, reply to the school district’s motion for summary
judgment for declaratory relief, the cheerleaders expressly acknowledged a
lack of live controversy and a lack of adversity on this issue: “KISD’s sudden
adoption of the Plaintiffs’ position that religious messages on the
Cheerleaders’ run-through banners are constitutionally permissible
vindicates the Cheerleaders’ rights and brings this case to an end.”252 The
cheerleaders stated that the school district’s request for declaratory relief was
“the SAME position the Plaintiffs (and the Texas Attorney General) have advocated from
day one. . . . [and] the SAME relief the Plaintiffs have requested in their
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.”253
The only point of disagreement between the parties was the classification
of the speech as private or government speech. Speech classification would
have been necessary for the question of waiver of governmental immunity to
the free speech and free exercise claims asserted in the cheerleaders’ petition.
The cheerleaders, though, specifically stated that “no additional ruling
regarding the nature of the speech is necessary at this time” because the

248
249

250
251
252

253

Id. at 5.
Id. at 7; see State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (barring advisory opinions
based on their non-justiciability). The second argument also implies that the school district
requested the trial court not adhere to the hierarchical precedent doctrine.
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish Committee at 15, Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze
Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2016) (No. 14-0453), 2015 WL 12911362, at *15.
See id. (discussing the logical result of the cheerleaders’ request).
Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
Response to Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment of Kountze ISD Regarding its Request
for Declaratory Relief at 1, Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526
(Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 2013), 2013 WL 2299634, at *1.
Id. at 2–3 (emphasis in original).
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“Court has already determined that the messages on the Cheerleaders’
banners is private speech” in its temporary injunction order.254
Regardless, that point of disagreement on the student speech
classification did not create a justiciable controversy as to the Establishment
Clause issue, because there was no controversy on that issue between actually
adverse parties. Every party in the lawsuit wanted the same resolution of the
question of whether the district’s allowance of the banners violated the
Establishment Clause.255 And that sought-after shared answer was “no.”
The cheerleaders’ April 29, 2013, filing solidified that the parties were not
adverse as to an Establishment Clause determination and that there was no
live, actual controversy or adversity on that issue. It does not matter that the
parties differed on the reasoning for that joint determination, because, as
Professor Ann Woolhandler has explained, the adverse party requirement
for justiciability is one of adverse legal interests and not adverse legal
arguments.256 Consequently, any Establishment Clause decision by the court
would be an improper advisory opinion on a nonjusticiable issue.
That impermissible advisory opinion is exactly what the court gave the
parties. Five days after this filing, and one month after the adoption of the
revised banners policy, on May 8, 2013, the trial court issued an order on the
parties’ multiple cross-motions for summary judgment, including the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding declaratory judgment
and the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction.257 Despite the vast complexity
of Establishment Clause doctrine,258 the court made a cursory decision on
the nonjusticiable issue of the application of that clause to the display of the

254
255

256

257
258

Id. at 3 n.12.
Although the FFRF had attempted to find someone in the Kountze High School community “to
bring a countersuit” that claimed a violation of the Establishment Clause, it “[was] unable to find
a person in the community who [was] willing to” do so. Green, supra note 211.
See Woolhandler, supra note 82, at 1032–33 (“Adverse legal arguments . . . are clearly not sufficient
for a case, nor are they always necessary. By contrast, adverse legal interests are necessary and often
sufficient. The most plausible version of the adverseness requirement is that a case requires a clash
of legal interests but does not always require a clash of argument.”).
Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8,
2013).
See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, School Vouchers and Tax Benefits in Federal and State
Judicial Constitutional Analysis, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1357 (2016) (emphasizing the difficulty of
judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause); Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring
the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1307–08 (1996)
(discussing the persistent, inherent difficulties of Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
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cheerleaders’ banners. 259 It did so in a nine-sentence, two-page order that
did not cite any case law; that incorporated only two references to the
“Establishment Clause” and one vague reference to the banners being
“constitutionally permissible”; and that made two opaque references to “any
other law.”260 There were no citations in the order.261
In this short opinion, the court granted the cheerleaders’ motion for
partial summary judgment in part and the school district’s motion for
summary judgment regarding its request for declaratory judgment.262
Although the plaintiffs had not asserted an Establishment Clause violation in
their petition, the court granted the district’s request for a declaratory
judgment about the Establishment Clause and made several conclusions of
law about that clause.263
First, the court found that the “religious messages expressed on runthrough banners have not created, and will not create, an establishment of
religion in the Kountze community.”264 Next, it concluded that “[t]he
Kountze cheerleaders’ banners that included religious messages and were
displayed during the 2012 football season were constitutionally
permissible.”265 Finally, it concluded that “[n]either the Establishment
Clause nor any other law prohibits the cheerleaders from using religiousthemed banners at school sporting events. Neither the Establishment Clause
nor any other law requires Kountze I.S.D. to prohibit the inclusion of
religious-themed banners at school sporting events.”266 The trial court did
not make an express classification of the cheerleaders’ speech as being either
private speech or government speech,267 which demonstrates that this order
was an impermissible advisory opinion as its scope was limited to an issue to
which the parties both agreed. By granting the cheerleaders’ motion for
partial summary judgment in part, this order implicitly denied the school

259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8,
2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
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district’s plea to jurisdiction.268 The school district appealed this denial of its
plea.269
2. The First Texas Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas in Beaumont determined that
the plaintiffs’ claims were made moot by the school district’s April 8, 2013,
policy that allowed the religiously themed run-through banners and the
district’s judicial admissions regarding no intentions to prohibit these banners
in the future.270 The court found there was no live controversy between the
parties because the district’s “allegedly wrongful behavior [had] passed and
[could not] reasonably be expected to recur.”271
With respect to the cheerleaders’ counterargument to mootness—that a
controversy still existed based on the disagreement between the parties as to
whether the students’ speech was “governmental speech, student-sponsored
speech, or private speech,” the court stated it had “no authority to resolve a
theoretical or contingent dispute.”272 Without any evidence in the record
that the district had prohibited the speech of the cheerleaders in light of the
April 8 policy, the court was not required to decide if there was a free speech
violation.273 The court emphasized that “[a]ny future policy regarding the
cheerleaders’ speech can be challenged at a later date” as the court was “not
empowered to decide cases on future contingencies or hypotheticals.”274
Consequently, the court did not classify the cheerleaders’ speech as being
either private speech or government speech,275 and the only mention of the
Establishment Clause in the opinion was a reference to the FFRF complaint
about the banners that led to the district superintendent’s initial restriction
policy.276 The question of whether the trial court had the power under
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276

Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2017 WL 4319908,
at *1 (Tex. App. Sept. 28, 2017).
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App. 2014).
Id. at 127–28, 134.
Id. at 127, 132.
Id. at 131.
See id. at 131–32 (holding that the school’s adoption of the new policy indicated that “the allegedly
wrongful behavior has passed and cannot reasonably be expected to recur”).
Id. at 132.
Id.
See id. at 125 (noting that a staff attorney with the FFRF wrote a letter to the superintendent
contending that the school district would violate the Establishment Clause by continuing to allow
the cheerleaders to put religious language on the banners).
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justiciability requirements to make a determination on the Establishment
Clause issue and whether it had issued an advisory opinion on a
nonjusticiable issue was not taken up by the court of appeals, despite its
apparent sua sponte duty to do so.277
Instead, the court found the trial court erred in its denial of the school
district’s plea to jurisdiction due to mootness, reversed the trial court’s order
in part based on the mootness finding for the plaintiffs’ substantive claims,
and rendered judgment that the school district’s plea to jurisdiction was
granted.278 The court also vacated the October 18, 2012, temporary
injunction.279 Importantly, the appellate court’s reversal of the trial court’s
decision was only a reversal of the portion of the trial court’s order that
granted the cheerleaders’ motion for partial summary judgment and
implicitly denied the district’s plea to jurisdiction.280 It did not reverse the
trial court’s order, granting in part the district’s motion for summary
judgment on its request for declaratory relief on the Establishment Clause’s
application to the case, because the appellate court stated that the school
district’s “request for declaratory relief is not a claim against [the
cheerleaders] and the grant of summary judgment to Kountze ISD on the
declaratory relief claim is not challenged on appeal by any party.”281 This
appellate decision was made on May 8, 2014.282 The cheerleaders petitioned
the Texas Supreme Court for review,283 and the petition for review was
granted by the state’s civil court of last resort.284
3. The Texas Supreme Court Decision
In the first sentence of its January 29, 2016, opinion, the Texas Supreme
Court noted that the sole issue on appeal was “whether the [school district’s]
voluntary cessation of challenged conduct rendered the plaintiffs’ claims for
prospective relief moot.”285 However, before proceeding to the mootness
analysis, the court recognized the parties’ dispute over the scope of the
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

See supra text accompanying note 119.
Matthews, 482 S.W.3d at 134.
Id.
Id. at 123–24, 134.
Id. at 124 n.1, 134.
Id. at 120.
Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. 2016).
Id. at 420.
Id. at 417.
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challenged conduct as a threshold matter.286 The court stated that “[t]he
cheerleaders contend that they are challenging the District’s ongoing policy
of treating their banners as ‘government’ speech[,]” while the school district
contends that the cheerleaders only challenged the discrete action of the
superintendent’s religious-message banners ban.287 The court noted the
district’s contention was that “the cheerleaders are attempting to reframe the
controversy as broader than they state in their petition.”288 However, the
state high court did not resolve this dispute or make any classification
decisions on whether the cheerleaders’ speech was private speech or
government speech, due to its resolution of the case only through a mootness
analysis.289 Consequently, the Court’s majority opinion contained no
references to the Establishment Clause.290 The question of whether the trial
court had issued an advisory opinion on a nonjusticiable Establishment
Clause issue was not taken up by the court, despite its apparent sua sponte duty
to do so.291
In its analysis, the court instead found that the case was not moot.292 This
determination was premised on the potential of a district policy reversal, the
district’s stance in the litigation, and the nature of the challenged conduct
being easily undone.293 Although the court acknowledged that “[t]he District
no longer prohibit[ed] the cheerleaders from displaying religious signs or
messages on banners at school-sponsored events[,] . . . that change hardly
[made] ‘absolutely clear’ that the District [would] not reverse itself after this
litigation [was] concluded.”294 The court found that the district’s continual
defense of the constitutionality of the prohibition and its claimed “unfettered
authority” to govern the content of the banners, as well as the absence of an
unconditional statement by the district that it would not reinstate the
prohibition, were significant factors that weighed against a mootness

286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294

Id. at 418.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 417–20.
See supra text accompanying note 119.
See Matthews, 484 S.W.3d at 418 (finding the case was not moot and, therefore, the court did not
have to address the issue of how the cheerleaders framed the controversy).
Id. at 418–19.
Id.
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finding.295 Finally, the court found that the easy potential reinstatement of
the prohibition policy contraindicated mootness.296
In its conclusion, the court determined that the district’s voluntary
cessation of the prohibition policy “provide[d] no assurance that the District
will not prohibit the cheerleaders from displaying banners with religious signs
or messages at school-sponsored events in the future.”297 The court also
found that the new district policy “only state[d] the District is not required to
prohibit the cheerleaders from displaying such banners, and reserves to the
District unfettered discretion in regulating those banners—including the
apparent authority to do so based solely on their religious content.”298 As a
result, the Texas Supreme Court determined the case was not moot.299 It
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that
court for further proceedings.300
In Justice Willett’s concurrence, the Establishment Clause and its
government speech/private speech dichotomy are referenced multiple
times.301 Justice Willett praised the court for its narrow decision on mootness
and its lack of classification of the student speech as government speech and
private speech.302 However, this concurrence also articulated concern over
the vigorous debate throughout the litigation regarding the applicability of
the Establishment Clause to the student speech and regarding whether the
speech was governmental or private.303 Justice Willett was troubled about
the parties’ conflicting conclusions regarding the trial court’s May 8, 2013,
order.304 Here, the school district interpreted that order to mean that the
students’ banners were the school’s (government) speech, while the
cheerleaders attested that “the order affirmed that the banners contain the
cheerleaders’ private speech.”305 The concurrence surmised that the
cheerleaders’ view was based on the inapplicability of the Establishment
Clause to private speech and the language of the temporary injunction
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305

Id. at 419.
Id.
Id. at 420.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 420–23 (Willett, J., concurring) (referencing the Establishment Clause six times).
See id. at 420 (lauding the court’s decision as “rightfully . . . within the borders of its authority”).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 422.
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order.306 The concurrence then emphasized that “[t]he record [did] not
yield a conclusive answer” on the classification of the religious speech, and
that “[w]e don’t know” the answer to that question.307 As a result, Justice
Willett called for clarity:
My concern is that this case may return to the trial court for a final decision
only to reappear on our docket with no clarity as to what this order achieves
and what claims are actually live. If that situation arises, the parties and trial
court would do well to confront the shadowy place in this litigation and
clarify with precision the status of this order and the cheerleaders’ claims.308

Given the incredible complexity of this litigation—and the lingering
questions as to whether the Establishment Clause prohibited the
cheerleaders’ religious run-through banners, whether the student speech is
government speech or private speech, and whether any of the state courts
should have decided these questions—the one thing that was
uncontrovertibly clear after the Texas Supreme Court’s decision was the
need for some clarity.
4. The Second Texas Court of Appeals Decision
That clarity, at least for Establishment Clause purposes, was not achieved
by the court of appeals’ September 28, 2017, unpublished decision.309 On
remand, and unlike the district court litigation, “[n]either party . . . raised
any issue concerning the Establishment Clause,” which the court expressly
acknowledged.310 Although the court stated that Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is “murky” and “complicated” when applied to student
religious speech,311 it specifically limited its discussion “to categorizing the
student speech at issue,” and not to any Establishment Clause determinations
given the absence of these issues raised by either party.312 So, once again,

306

307
308
309

310
311
312

Id. (“[T]he cheerleaders contended that ‘the Establishment Clause . . . is inapplicable to private
speech[,]’ which, taken together with the text of the temporary injunction order, could explain the
cheerleaders’ understanding . . . .”).
Id.
Id. at 423.
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2017 WL 4319908
(Tex. App. Sept. 28, 2017); see also Collins v. Ison-Newsome, 73 S.W.3d 178, 180 (Tex. 2001) (citing
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7) (“[U]npublished opinions ‘have no precedential value and must not be cited
as authority by counsel or by a court . . . .’”).
Matthews, 2017 WL 4319908, at *3 n.3.
Id. at *3 (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371, 382 (5th Cir. 2011)).
Id. at *3 & n.3.
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the question of whether the Establishment Clause issue was a justiciable one
for resolution by the trial court was not taken up by the court of appeals,
despite its apparent sua sponte duty to do so.313
Instead, the remand centered on whether the trial court had properly
denied the school district’s original plea to the court’s jurisdiction based on
issues of governmental immunity and standing.314 This discussion was
limited to the school district’s original plea to the district court’s
jurisdiction,315 because the school district’s supplemental plea to the court’s
jurisdiction based on mootness had been disposed of by the Texas Supreme
Court.316 In order for the trial court to have had proper subject matter
jurisdiction over the lawsuit, the cheerleaders must have alleged facts to
prove a valid waiver of governmental immunity and proper standing.317 The
court of appeals highlighted that the trial court’s May 8, 2013, order was an
“implicit” denial of the school district’s plea to the jurisdiction because the
cheerleaders’ motion for partial summary judgment was granted in part by
the trial court.318
The key determination for the court of appeals regarding this question
of waiver of governmental immunity was whether the cheerleaders’ religious
speech on the banners constituted private speech, as claimed by the
cheerleaders, or government speech, as claimed by the school district.319 The
court recognized that this classification dispute had been the “central
disagreement” between the parties in the litigation,320 and it stated that it
must engage in an extended classification analysis to resolve it.321
The government speech/private speech classification was premised only
upon an analysis of the question of waiver of governmental immunity to the
free speech and free exercise claims in the cheerleaders’ original petition.322
The court began its analysis by stating that under the government speech

313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322

See supra text accompanying note 119.
Matthews, 2017 WL 4319908, at *1, *2.
Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. 2016).
See id. at 418.
Matthews, 2017 WL 4319908, at *2, *14.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *2 (noting that the issue of whether the speech is government speech or private speech
controls the questions of governmental immunity).
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doctrine, “[g]overnment speech is ‘not subject to scrutiny under the Free
Speech Clause,’” which allows the government to restrict its own speech
without implicating First Amendment speech provisions.323 Pursuant to that
doctrine, if the banners were pure government speech, then that would be
an “absolute defense” to the cheerleaders’ free speech claims and “the
Cheerleaders could not prove a valid waiver of immunity from suit in order
to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over their claim.”324 If the
speech was private speech, then “governmental immunity has been waived
for” the cheerleaders’ free speech claims.325
Ultimately, the court found that the cheerleaders’ speech was “the pure
private speech of the students” for the purposes of finding the trial court had
proper subject matter jurisdiction over the free speech claims.326 In this
analysis, the court invoked Santa Fe’s government speech/private speech
dichotomy.327 Here, the court distinguished the cheerleaders’ religious
banners from the football game student invocations that had been held to be
government speech for Establishment Clause analysis in Santa Fe:328
In contrast, Kountze ISD makes no claim in this case that the Cheerleaders
were required or encouraged in any way to include religious messages on the
banners. Likewise, there is no school policy or rule that, in actuality or effect,
even suggested, much less required, the placement of religious messages on
the banners. Indeed, until the school year in question, the messages painted
on the banners had been entirely non-religious in nature. The extent of the
school’s policy concerning banners was that the cheerleaders should make
banners to promote school spirit at football games. The text and content of
the message, aside from the prohibition on obscene material, is, was, and
always had been, left up to the discretion of the cheerleaders. Thus, we find
the reasoning in Santa Fe to be inapposite.329

The court instead found that the cheerleaders’ speech was “genuinely
student-initiated” per an application of reasoning from other Establishment
Clause case law and was, therefore, protected private speech.330
Consequently, the court held that “the Cheerleaders pleaded sufficient facts

323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330

Id. at *2 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *13.
See id. at *7 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000)).
See id. at *8 (contrasting the student election system in Santa Fe with the lack of a school policy
suggesting or requiring the placement of religious messages on the banners in Matthews).
Id.
Id. (quoting Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999)).
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to show both a waiver of immunity and to affirmatively demonstrate that the
trial court possessed jurisdiction over the dispute.”331
There was no judicial discussion as to whether the trial court rendered
an advisory opinion on the Establishment Clause in its May 8, 2013, order.
Aside from one reference, the school district’s motion for summary judgment
on its request for declaratory relief was not discussed.332 There was no
discussion of the school district’s uncontested request for a judicial
declaration that there was no Establishment Clause violation. There was no
discussion of the result of the court of appeals’ previous failure to reverse the
trial court’s granting in part of the district’s motion for summary judgment
on its request for declaratory relief on the Establishment Clause declaration.
Instead, after the government immunity analysis, the court simply overruled
“the school district’s issue on appeal and affirm[ed] the trial court’s ruling to
deny Kountze ISD’s plea to the jurisdiction.”333
With respect to the standing issue, the court rejected the school district’s
claim that the individual cheerleader plaintiffs lacked standing to sue on
behalf of the entire squad, which made group decisions on the content of the
banners.334 Specifically, the court found that the cheerleader litigants did not
“lose their individual rights to free speech by speaking as a group.”335 The
propriety of the cheerleaders’ parents bringing suit on behalf of their children
was not disputed.336 Therefore, the court also overruled the lack of standing
issue based on each minor cheerleader having “a justiciable interest in the
controversy” through an allegation of a “breach of her constitutional right to
freedom of speech,” which gave each of them standing to sue.337 The final
sentence of the opinion stated: “Having overruled all of the issues of Kountze
ISD on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the plea to the
jurisdiction.”338 However, the question of whether the trial court issued an
impermissible advisory opinion on the Establishment Clause, which goes to

331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338

Id. at *13
See id. at *1 (discussing the procedural history of the case).
Id. at *13.
See id. at *14.
Id.
See id. (“It is undisputed that each of the individual cheerleaders who sued was represented by their
parents as that respective minor’s next friend . . . .”).
See id.
Id.
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the heart of justiciability and was an issue that the court should have
examined sua sponte, was never addressed.339
5. Subsequent Requests for Review to the Texas Supreme Court
The school district filed a petition for review of the appellate court’s
decision with the Texas Supreme Court on January 15, 2018.340 This
petition for review explicitly stated that “[n]either party has raised any issue
concerning the Establishment Clause.”341 The Texas Supreme Court denied
the petition on August 31, 2018, without an opinion.342 In Texas, the denial
of a petition for review indicates that the “Texas Supreme Court is not
satisfied that the opinion of the court of appeals has correctly declared the
law in all respects but determines that the petition presents no error that
requires reversal or that is of such importance to the jurisprudence of the
State as to require correction.”343
After the denial of the petition, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton
made a public announcement supporting the Texas Supreme Court’s denial
of review.344 In a news release, he championed the Texas Court of Appeals’
private-speech classification decision, claiming that “[t]he Kountze
cheerleaders case involved personal expressions of faith and an ill-advised
school district change of policy that mislabeled their expressions as
government speech.”345 He framed the case as a win for “[r]eligious liberty[,
which] is the foundation upon which our society has been built.”346 He
concluded with his endorsement of the “precedent” set by this case: “The
Texas Supreme Court’s decision ensures that the Kountze cheerleaders and

339
340
341
342

343
344

345
346

See supra text accompanying note 119.
See Petition for Review, Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 484 S.W.3d 416
(Tex. Jan. 15, 2018) (No. 17-0988).
Id. at 10 n.3.
See Denial of Petition for Review, Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 484
S.W.3d 416 (Tex. Aug. 31, 2018) (No. 17-0988), http://www.search.txcourts.gov/Search
Media.aspx?MediaVersionID=5348b981-5cec-4a21-bd15-b3291308d3d4&coa=cossup&DT=PE
T%20FOR%20REVIEW%20DISP&MediaID=8d6afa52-d0b8-4f77-bf4e-2a57637165e5.
TEXAS LAW REVIEW ASS’N, TEXAS RULES OF FORM: THE GREENBOOK app. D (14th ed. 2018).
Press Release, Tex. Office of the Att’y Gen., AG Paxton: Texas Supreme Court’s Decision in
Kountze Cheerleaders’ Case is a Win for Religious Liberty (Aug. 31, 2018), available at
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-texas-supreme-courts-decisionkountze-cheerleaders-case-win-religious-liberty.
Id.
Id.
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other cheerleaders across the state will be able to display their expressions of
faith on banners at football games.”347
The school district filed a motion for rehearing with the Texas Supreme
Court on October 2, 2018, in which it asked for a declaration that the case
was moot and a vacatur of all of the prior decisions in the case.348 Here, the
school district argued the case became moot on March 24, 2017, when all of
the original plaintiff cheerleaders no longer were eligible to be school
cheerleaders due to graduating or not qualifying for the squad, which was six
months prior to the state court of appeals decision that classified the banners
as private speech.349 The school district argued that, with the case becoming
moot, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to make this decision, and,
instead, should have dismissed the case.350
The school district next argued that the “cheerleaders abandoned” the
controversy regarding whether the banners constitute private speech “by
agreeing in substance and form to the trial court’s [May 8, 2013] order which
disposed of their motion for summary judgment without characterizing the
banners as their private speech.”351 Without a live controversy between the
parties as to whether the banners were the students’ private speech, the court
of appeals lacked jurisdiction to classify the banners as private speech.352
Consequently, the school district argued that the September 28, 2017,
opinion of the court of appeals was a prohibited advisory opinion.353 It did
not argue the same as to the original trial court’s order, which makes sense
as the school district wanted that judicial declaration that the district was not
violating the Establishment Clause.
In the alternative to these mootness arguments, the school district argued
the high court should grant the petition for review because the appellate
court’s determination that the banners were private speech conflicted with
the First Amendment.354 Here, the district argued the banners were schoolsponsored government speech under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354

Id.
See Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing of the Denial of Its Petition for Review at 24, Kountze Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 484 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. Oct. 2, 2018) (No. 17-0988).
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
See id. (arguing that “[s]uch an opinion is prohibited under Texas law”).
Id. at 15.
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free-speech jurisprudence,355 and, as such, the district’s government
immunity had not been waived.356 Therefore, the district argued that the
Texas Supreme Court should grant the petition for review and reverse the
appellate court’s order that affirmed the denial of the school district’s plea to
the jurisdiction.357
The school district’s final argument for the grant of its petition for review
was an Establishment Clause argument.358 Specifically, the school district
argued that “[t]he petition for review should be granted because the lower
court’s decision could lead to the violation of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.”359 Here, the school district said that Santa Fe made clear
the cheerleaders’ run-through banners were government speech under
Establishment Clause jurisprudence because of the perception of school
endorsement they created and because they were the result of a majoritarian
selection process among the squad.360 If the school district was “unable to
maintain reasonable control over the school-sponsored speech on runthrough banners, it [would be] likely that the expression contained on the
banners would be attributed to the school and that such attribution of the
content of the unregulated banners could potentially subject the school to
liability for violations of the Establishment Clause” under Santa Fe in the
future.361 Therefore, the school district urged the Texas Supreme Court to
“grant this motion and the petition for review, recognize that the banners are
school-sponsored speech, and assist [the school district] in avoiding future
lawsuits based on the Establishment Clause.”362 The Texas Supreme Court
denied the school district’s motion for rehearing of the denial of its petition
for review on November 9, 2018, without opinion.363
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363

See id. at 15–20 (“Pursuant to Hazelwood and its progeny, the banners are school-sponsored speech
and may be regulated.”).
Id. at 21–22.
Id.
See id. at 22–24 (using the interpretation of the Establishment Clause from Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)).
Id. at 22.
See id. at 23–24 (citing Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 307–08, 314, 316–17).
Id. at 22 (citing Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290).
Id. at 24.
Denial of Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing of the Denial of its Petition for Review, Kountze Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 484 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. Nov. 9, 2018) (No. 17-0988),
http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=fc350abd-391b-483e-a30
2-66b58a2c2d63&coa=cossup&DT=REHEARING%20DISP&MediaID=f031814b-daa2-4d8c8edd-9df35369bc70.
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6. Lessons to be Learned from the Confusion of this Case
This convoluted case is paradigmatic of the confusion and lack of clarity
regarding the Establishment Clause and the classification of student religious
speech as government speech or private speech. The trial court made an
error in issuing its order on May 8, 2013, that declared as a conclusion of law
that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit “the cheerleaders from using
religious-themed banners at school sporting events,” given the absence of a
justiciable controversy for that issue.364 Without a live controversy between
adverse parties, the court should not have rendered a prohibited advisory
opinion on any Establishment Clause issues.365 This was the very definition
of a nonjusticiable issue, but the trial court proceeded regardless in violation
of the fundamental justiciability requirements and constitutional provisions
of the state—requirements that parallel the justiciability requirements of the
federal courts.
In their original petition, the cheerleaders alleged that their free-speech
and free-exercise rights were violated.366 They did not assert an
Establishment Clause violation, because they wanted their banners classified
as protected private speech for free speech and free exercise purposes.367 And
it is clear that private speech is not subject to Establishment Clause
constraints.368 The school district’s motion for summary judgment regarding
its request for declaratory relief, in which it sought a judicial declaration that
the district’s allowance of the cheerleaders’ display of religiously themed

364
365

366
367

368

Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796, at *2 (Tex. D. Ct. May 8,
2013).
See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2012) (“The Texas Constitution—the
source of the requirements of justiciability in Texas—bars our courts from rendering advisory
opinions and limits access to the courts to those individuals who have suffered an actual, concrete
injury.”).
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Tex. App. 2014).
See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 20–21, Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484
S.W.3d 416 (Tex. Aug. 27, 2015) (No. 14-0453), 2015 WL 10321932 (stating that a necessary
component of the district court’s order was that the banners were private, and not government,
speech, which was in accord with the cheerleaders’ position).
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion)) (providing the private speech and government speech
dichotomy for Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
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banners at football games was not a violation of the Establishment Clause,
did not convert the action to a live Establishment Clause controversy.369
This is so because there was not an actual controversy between actually
adverse parties as to the Establishment Clause determination, and an actual
controversy between adverse parties with adverse legal interests is required
in order for a Texas court to have the authority to make an adjudication on
a justiciable matter,370 including when a party is requesting a declaratory
judgment.371 The state’s provisions on declaratory relief do not give the
courts carte blanche to decide all controversies, regardless of their
justiciability.372 The cheerleaders’ response to this motion clearly indicated
that there was no live controversy or adversity as to the Establishment Clause
issue, because the parties sought the exact same relief on that issue.373
The only remaining potentially justiciable issues at the time of the May
8, 2013, order were 1) the question of waiver of governmental immunity to
the free-speech and free-exercise claims, which would require the
classification of the banners as government speech or private speech, and 2)
the standing of the individual plaintiffs to bring suit when the squad made
decisions on the banners’ content as a group. These issues were only
potentially justiciable given that the initial banners restriction had been
amended prior to the court’s order, which raised the question of mootness of
the cheerleaders’ original claims. The court order failed to make any
determination on either of those potentially justiciable issues and made a
decision instead on a nonjusticiable issue in the endemically complex
Establishment Clause arena.374
369

370
371
372

373
374

See Kountze ISD’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment of
Kountze ISD Regarding Its Request for Declaratory Relief at 1–3, Matthews v. Kountze Indep.
Sch. Dist., No. 53526 (Tex. D. Ct. May 3, 2013), 2013 WL 2299644, at *1–3 (requesting court to
issue a declaration that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the school district from allowing
the cheerleader squad to utilize religious messages on run-through banners).
See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (providing
justiciability requirements under the Texas Constitution).
See Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 240 (Tex. 2011) (requiring an actual controversy to have
a justiciable declaratory judgment proceeding).
See Denver City Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Moses, 51 S.W.3d 386, 391 (Tex. App. 2001) (stating that the
Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural vehicle to decide controversies that already exist within
the court’s jurisdiction).
See supra text accompanying notes 250–51.
See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 387, 392 (1983) (stating the Supreme Court has “oft-repeated [that
the Establishment Clause] . . . presents especially difficult questions of interpretation and
application.”).
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In doing so, the trial court issued an order and opinion that stated these
banners did not violate the Establishment Clause, without an express
classification of the student speech as either government speech or private
speech.375 It did so summarily in nine sentences with no references to any
case law, with two mentions of the term “the Establishment Clause,” and
with no legal citations.376 Essentially, the trial court found that there was no
Establishment Clause violation because the court said so. Ipse dixit, there you
go.377 While the summary nature of this opinion should not be too harshly
criticized, given the overwhelming dockets that Texas trial courts, like all
courts, face,378 basic rules of hierarchical precedent still must apply when
lower courts issue decisions. A just application of the law requires more than
a conclusory, unsupported statement.379 Such criticism of the cursory nature
of the opinion could easily have been avoided, though, had the court declined
to decide the nonjusticiable issue, as it was legally bound to do.
The trial court failed to comply with justiciability limits when it issued
such an impermissible advisory opinion by judicial fiat,380 and all of the
reviewing appellate courts should have reversed and vacated this
Establishment Clause aspect of the trial court’s judgment as a matter of
law.381 This was cogently argued by the American Jewish Committee in its
375
376

377

378

379

380
381

See Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796, at *1–2 (Tex. D. Ct.
May 8, 2013) (concluding that the banners were constitutionally permissible but not stating why).
Id.; see Brett A. Geier & Annie Blankenship, Praying for Touchdowns: Contemporary Law and Legislation
for Prayer in Public School Athletics, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 381, 405 (2017) (critically deeming this
district court order “very succinct”).
See Ipse Dixit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (translating “ipse dixit” to “‘he himself said
it” and defining it as “[s]omething asserted but not proved”); Richard C. Wydick, The Attorney-Client
Privilege: Does It Really Have Life Everlasting?, 87 KY. L.J. 1165, 1172 n.41 (1998)
(“Ipse dixit means roughly: it’s so because I say so.”).
See OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY:
FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 2–9 (2018), available at https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1443455/2018-arstatistical-final.pdf (showing statewide trend of increasingly heavy caseloads for all Texas civil
courts).
See Mary B. Trevor, From Ostriches to Sci-Fi: A Social Science Analysis of the Impact of Humor in Judicial
Opinions, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 291, 302 (2014) (arguing judges must provide clear and credible
explanations in their opinions).
See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (discussing how
neither Texas nor federal courts can render advisory opinions).
See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 315 (1991) (vacating an appellate court’s judgment and
remanding with instructions to dismiss a nonjusticiable cause of action when there was an absence
of a live controversy filed and decided upon in the trial court); State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891
S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (providing that a decision that does not bind the parties is by definition
an impermissible advisory opinion).
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brief as an amicus curiae to the Texas Supreme Court.382 Each of the
reviewing courts should have examined this core justiciability issue sua sponte.
None of the state’s appellate courts did so.383 As a prudential matter, the
courts should also have avoided this improper course to not contribute to the
jurisprudential confusion that surrounds the Establishment Clause. This was
a fundamental error that contravened all of the requirements of justiciability
and a missed opportunity by all of these courts to provide much needed
clarity in this area of school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It also
set up state officials to endorse the continued practice of school districts’
allowance of the display of these types of student religious messages as per se
constitutional,384 which creates a public perception that this practice will
never be an Establishment Clause violation.385 And this is all based on a
nine-sentence order on a nonjusticiable issue. If faced with similar cases in
the future, courts should avoid the costly mistakes of the Matthews case.386
B. The Establishment Clause and Student-Led Graduation Invocations: The Judicial
Fiat Dilemma of Schultz v. Medina Valley Independent School District
When the Supreme Court limited its review in Santa Fe only to the
establishment question of the football game prayer policy and did not review
the constitutionality of the school district’s “allow[ing] students to read
Christian invocations and benedictions from the stage at graduation
ceremonies,”387 it left the question of whether state policies and practices
regarding student invocations at public school graduations were violative of
the Establishment Clause open for future judicial resolution and public
382

383
384
385

386
387

See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish Committee at 2–3, Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-0453, 2015 WL 12911362, at *2–3 (Tex. Aug. 20, 2015) (arguing the trial
court’s advisory opinion on a nonjusticiable matter was error).
See Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App. 2014).
See Paxton, supra note 344 (describing the Texas Attorney General’s support of the Kountze
cheerleaders’ “personal expressions of faith”).
See, e.g., Bob Cook, US Supreme Court is Hinting Public School Coaches Won’t Have to Leave Religion on the
Sidelines, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2019/02/22/ussupreme-court-is-hinting-public-school-coaches-wont-have-to-leave-religion-on-the-sidelines/#11
23e38818ff (characterizing the Texas Supreme Court’s Kountze decision as “a curious decision, to
say that public school cheerleaders writing religious messages in their school-issued uniforms with
school-issued pens on school-issued banners to have players run through in front of God and
everybody is constitutionally okie-dokie”).
This case example is relevant to all courts given the symmetry between the federal and Texas
justiciability requirements. See supra Part II.A. (discussing Texas justiciability requirements).
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 295 (2000).

964

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:4

debate.388 Although there have been many cases that have touched on the
issue of student prayer at school graduations,389 there have been relatively
few federal cases that have been litigated since Santa Fe that have involved
the constitutionality of an express student “invocation” policy for school
graduations.
1. The Trial Court Proceedings
One prominent example of such a case is Schultz v. Medina Valley
Independent School District, which was filed in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas on May 26, 2011.390 In the complaint, a
graduating agnostic senior of Medina Valley High School, Corwyn Schultz,
his agnostic parents, and his agnostic brother, a graduate of the high
school,391 claimed that the school district violated the Establishment Clause
through its “longstanding custom, practice, and policy of sponsoring
graduation prayers” as evidenced by its express, formal inclusion of an
“‘invocation’ and ‘benediction’” in its “official graduation-ceremony
program.”392 The Schultz family first contacted the school district on
October 10, 2010, raising constitutional concerns with this policy and asking
whether the upcoming graduation would include prayer.393 Because the
school district did not notify the Schultz family until May 25, 2011,394 that
the June 4, 2011, graduation ceremony would include an invocation and

388

389
390
391
392
393

394

See Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: Reflections on Some Critiques, 47
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1144 (2010) (discussing the different perspectives on the constitutionality
of graduation prayers at public schools); Frederick B. Jonassen, Free Speech and Establishment Clause
Rights at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: A Disclaimer: The Preceding Speech Was Government Censored
and Does Not Represent the Views of the Valedictorian, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 683, 730 (2009) (discussing the
lack of resolution on this issue by Santa Fe).
See Sorkin, supra note 27, at 357–95 (providing a comprehensive account of the federal court cases
that have addressed the constitutionality of public school graduation prayer).
Complaint, Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5:11-cv-422, 2011 WL 7561368 (W.D.
Tex. May 26, 2011).
See id. at 5 (describing the Schultz family’s religious background).
Id. at 5–6.
Plaintiff-Appellees’ Opposition to Defendant-Appellant’s Emergency Motion to Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 12, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th Cir.
June 3, 2011).
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction at 4, Schultz
v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5:11-cv-422 (W.D. Tex. May 26, 2011), 2011 WL 7561377,
at *4.
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benediction,395 the plaintiffs filed a motion for a TRO and a preliminary
injunction on the same day as the complaint, asking the court to enjoin
prayer at the graduation ceremony.396 On May 27, 2011, the presiding
judge, Chief Judge Fred Biery, entered an order that set the motion for TRO
and preliminary injunction for hearing on May 31, 2011.397
After that hearing, on June 1, 2011, the federal district court entered an
amended order that granted the plaintiffs’ injunctive relief motion, based on
a finding of a likelihood of plaintiffs’ success on the merits that the inclusion
of the graduation prayers violated the Establishment Clause and stating that
the court was bound to follow Santa Fe and other controlling Establishment
Clause precedent.398 It cited to eleven cases in support of its decision.399 The
court ordered the school district to “remove the terms ‘invocation’ and
‘benediction’ from the graduation ceremony programs and to replace them
“with ‘opening remarks’ and ‘closing remarks.’”400 It also ordered the school
district to tell the students who had been “selected to deliver the ‘invocation’
and ‘benediction’ to modify their remarks to be statements of their own
beliefs as opposed to leading the audience in prayer.”401
Further, all graduation speakers were to:
be instructed that they may not ask audience members to “stand,” “join in
prayer,” or “bow their heads,” they may not end their remarks with “amen”
or “in [a deity’s name] we pray,” and they shall not otherwise deliver a
message that would commonly be understood to be a prayer, nor use the
word “prayer” unless it is used in the student’s expression of the student’s
personal belief, as opposed to encouraging others who may not believe in
the concept of prayer to join in and believe the same concept. The students
may in stating their own personal beliefs speak through conduct such as
kneeling to face Mecca, the wearing of a yarmulke or hijab or making the
sign of the cross.402

395
396
397

398
399
400
401
402

Id. at 2–5.
See id. at 1, 11.
Order Setting Hearing on Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
Schultz, No. 5:11-cv-422-FB, available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry No. 10).
Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, 2011 WL 13234770, at *1
(W.D. Tex. June 1, 2011).
See id. at *1 (citing eleven cases).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, the school district was ordered to review the students’ remarks to
ensure compliance with the order and to instruct the students not to deviate
from their district-approved remarks at the graduation ceremony.403
2. The Interlocutory Appeal to the Fifth Circuit
On June 2, 2011, the school district filed an emergency amended appeal
in the Fifth Circuit to dissolve the trial court’s order.404 This twenty-page
emergency motion had extensive citations to the Constitution and Supreme
Court authority.405 On the same day, the school’s valedictorian, Angelina
Hildenbrand, who wanted to pray during her speech, sought to intervene in
the appeal in opposition to the district court’s order.406 The State of Texas
also filed a twenty-three page amicus brief with citations to hierarchical
precedent in the matter.407 In a statement to the public about the case, Texas
Attorney General Abbott stated, “This is part of an ongoing attempt to purge
God from the public setting, while at the same time demanding from the
court increased yielding to all things agnostic and atheistic[.]”408 Abbott also
stated that “[Judge] Biery’s ruling would allow a student to ‘bend over in
honor of Mecca,’ but not lead a prayer to the Christian God.”409 The Schultz
family filed their response in opposition to the appeal on June 3, 2011, in a
forty-eight page brief with extensive citations to the Constitution and
Supreme Court precedent.410

403
404

405

406

407
408
409
410

Id.
Amended Appeal of Order, Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5:11-cv-00422-FB,
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry
No. 19). The school district had filed an appeal with the Fifth Circuit of the first order of the court
on June 1, 2011. Appeal of Order, Schultz, No. 5:11-cv-00422-FB, available at https://www.clearing
house.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry No. 17).
See Medina Valley Independent School District’s Opposed Emergency Motion to Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch.
Dist., No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011).
Jim Forsyth, Valedictorian Fights Judge’s Ban on Graduation Prayer, REUTERS (June 2, 2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-prayer-graduation-texas/valedictorian-fights-judges-ban-ongraduation-prayer-idUSTRE75177D20110602.
See Brief of the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae, Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No.
11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011).
Forsyth, supra note 406.
Id.
See Plaintiff-Appellees’ Opposition to Defendant-Appellant’s Emergency Motion to Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3,
2011).
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In the appeal, the school district argued that the plaintiffs could not meet
their burden of a strong showing that they were entitled to injunctive relief.411
The school district argued that the district court had abused its discretion
with its injunctive order, because “[t]he District clearly ha[d] not violated the
Establishment Clause” and the graduation policies were consistent with the
Establishment Clause.412 The school district cited to the government
speech/private speech dichotomy in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.413
It distinguished Santa Fe, as that case dealt with “prayer at football games” and
not prayer at “graduation ceremonies.”414 It asserted that the speaker selection
process, based on a random drawing from student volunteers from a pool of
“the top three academically ranked graduates, the class president, and
student council officers,” created a limited public forum for the graduation
ceremony.415 Consequently, the central argument of the school district
revolved around how to classify the religious speech of the students within
the dichotomy of government speech and private speech in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.416 Specifically, the school district asserted that the
“student speakers at graduation unquestionably are engaging in private
speech that is altogether distinctive from government speech and does not
run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”417 The school district also argued
that the court’s injunctive relief order failed to make the requisite findings of
fact and conclusions of law under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.418
In their opposition to the appeal, the Schultz family argued that the
school district lacked standing to assert the constitutional rights of its
students, that the district was not entitled to expedited relief given its sixmonth delay in responding to their inquiry as to whether the graduation
ceremony would include prayer and its lack of cooperation in the trial court
proceedings, and that the school district had “not met the procedural
411

412
413
414
415
416
417

418

See Medina Valley Independent School District’s Opposed Emergency Motion to Stay Enforcement
of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 14, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th Cir.
June 3, 2011).
See id. at 4, 14.
See id. at 7.
Id. at 9 (emphasis in original) (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)).
Id. at 10–11.
See id. at 11–12.
Medina Valley Independent School District’s Opposed Emergency Motion to Stay Enforcement
of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 11, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th Cir.
June 3, 2011).
See id. at 13–14.
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requirements for a stay of the preliminary injunction.”419 The Schultz family
also argued the district court correctly found that the plaintiffs were likely to
prevail on the merits of the case.420 They asserted that the Supreme Court’s
emphasis in Lee v. Weisman on the unconstitutional coercion of prayers at
graduation ceremonies applied to the graduation at hand.421 In opposition
to the school district, the Schultz family argued that Santa Fe did apply to the
graduation invocation and benediction “prayers delivered by students”422 and
that Santa Fe applied to prayer at graduation ceremonies, not just football
games.423 They argued that graduation ceremonies are not limited public
forums.424
Finally, they argued against the private speech classification, stating that
“[t]he reasonable observer could hardly be expected to appreciate that the
graduation speeches are private when they arise in a context of pervasive
religiosity that is plainly government-sponsored.”425 Therefore, these
speeches “would reasonably be perceived to be government-sponsored,”
which meant that the Establishment Clause regulated this type of religious
student speech.426 Consequently, the plaintiff-appellees urged the court to
not grant the school district’s emergency motion to dissolve the trial court’s
order because:
Only by distorting and ignoring the relevant case law can the District build
support for the unprecedented rule of law that it invites the Court to adopt,
namely, that Medina High School’s graduation prayer-givers are purely
private actors — and can thus present even sectarian and proselytizing
messages — even though the students have been asked by the school to
present their messages, the messages have been denominated in the program
of ceremonies as an “invocation” and “benediction” and have been prescreened by government officials, and the messages comprise a formal
portion of a government-controlled ceremony presented to a captive
audience whose attendance is not “in any real sense of the term[,]
‘voluntary.’”427
419

420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427

See Plaintiff-Appellees’ Opposition to Defendant-Appellant’s Emergency Motion to Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 11–15, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th
Cir. June 3, 2011).
See id. at 16.
See id. (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587, 592 (1992)).
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 21–22.
See id. at 28.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 1–2.
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The next day, during the afternoon of June 3, 2011,428 the Fifth Circuit
dissolved the TRO and injunction in a per curiam decision, based on a foursentence determination:
On this incomplete record at this preliminary injunction stage of the case,
we are not persuaded that plaintiffs have shown that they are substantially
likely to prevail on the merits, particularly on the issue that the individual
prayers or other remarks to be given by students at graduation are, in fact,
school-sponsored. We also observe in particular that the plaintiffs’ motion
may be rooted at least in part in circumstances that no longer exist. For
example, the school has apparently abandoned including the words
“invocation” and “benediction” on the program. The motion also did not
expressly address the involvement of the valedictorian in the graduation
ceremony.429

There was no mention of the Constitution, the Establishment Clause, or any
case law in the entire opinion,430 although the reference to whether the
graduation prayers were “school-sponsored” presumably reflected the core
Establishment Clause government speech/private speech dichotomy.431 The
court also denied Ms. Hildenbrand’s motion to intervene and permitted her
to proceed as amicus curiae.432 The court remanded the case to the trial court
“for possible further proceedings.”433 In support of the Fifth Circuit’s
decision, Attorney General Abbott stated, “‘It should not be illegal for
students to say a prayer at a graduation ceremony. Now, the federal court
of appeals agrees.’”434

428

429
430
431
432
433
434

See Ethan Cole, Texas Graduation Takes Advantage of Prayer Ruling, Goes All Out, CHRISTIAN POST REP.
(June 5, 2011), https://www.christianpost.com/news/texas-graduation-takes-advantage-of-prayer
-ruling-goes-all-out.html (stating the Fifth Circuit’s decision came down “late Friday”).
Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486, 1–2 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011), available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0005.pdf.
See generally id.
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (discussing the differences between
government speech endorsing religion and private speech endorsing religion).
Schultz, No. 11-50486, at 2.
Id.
Raven Clabough, Fed Appeals Court Overturns Prayer Ban at Medina Valley, TX Graduation, NEW AM.
(June 6, 2011), https://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/faith-and-morals/item/933-fed-app
eals-court-overturns-prayer-ban-at-medina-valley-tx-graduation.
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3. The Aftermath of the Fifth Circuit Decision
The Medina Valley High School graduation took place the next day, on
Saturday, June 4, 2011,435 with increased security based in part on threats
against Hildenbrand.436 The school district superintendent provided a
disclaimer at the start of the graduation ceremony that the “speakers’ views
were their own.”437 The graduation programs did not contain the terms
“invocation” and “benediction” as the school district had determined, after
scrutinizing this policy, that those terms “could be misinterpreted.”438 Those
terms were changed to “opening remarks” and “closing remarks.”439 The
student who delivered these opening remarks began by saying, “Those who
wish, would you please pray with me?”440 There were many prayers and
invocations to God during the ceremony, including in the valedictory speech
and the speech by Texas State Representative John V. Garza.441 The
graduation ceremony “was likened to a revival meeting.”442 Corwyn Schultz,
the student who had brought the original action, and his family did not
attend the graduation.443
By that Saturday, multiple critiques and threats had been made against
Judge Biery and the courthouse staff.444 Anonymous sources within the
courthouse reported to the media that “Biery and the court got more than
500 calls from people all over the country, demanding he change his
ruling.”445 Senator John Cornyn, one of the United States senators from
Texas, “blasted Biery’s order, saying it was hostile to ‘all things religious in
public life.’”446 Regarding the trial court’s order, Governor Perry stated,
435

436

437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446

See Craig Kapitan, Medina Valley Graduates Hear Prayers Aplenty, MY SAN ANTONIO (June 4, 2011,
11:54 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Medina-Valley-graduateshear-prayers-aplenty-1410195.php (describing the aftermath of the litigation).
See Guillermo Contreras, Appeals Panel Overturns Medina Valley Graduation Prayer Ban, MY SAN
ANTONIO (June 4, 2011, 7:33 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article
/Appeals-panel-overturns-Medina-Valley-graduation-1408548.php (describing the aftermath of
the litigation).
Kapitan, supra note 435.
Contreras, supra note 436.
Id.
Kapitan, supra note 435.
See id. (describing the commencement ceremony).
Cole, supra note 428.
See Kapitan, supra note 435 (detailing the commencement ceremony).
See Contreras, supra note 436 (describing the physical dangers caused by the prayer controversy).
Id.
Id.
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“The reprehensible action taken by a federal judge underscores the
increasingly inappropriate federal encroachment into the lives of Americans
by unconstitutionally banning prayer at a Texas high school
graduation[.]”447
The trial court proceedings continued after the graduation, and so did
the vitriol.448 Judge Biery was given “a nearly round-the-clock security
detail” by the federal marshals in response to the threats he received after his
ruling.449 Groups called for the judge’s resignation.450 Presidential hopeful
Newt Gingrich advocated for the elimination of “dictatorial religious bigots
such as Judge Biery” at campaign stops.451 On national television, Gingrich
stated that Judge Biery should be subpoenaed by Congress to explain his
ruling.452 Gingrich went on to say that “he would send the U.S. Capitol
Police or U.S. Marshals to arrest [judges] and force them to testify” as a way
to make federal judges, like Judge Biery, “comply with [these types of]
congressional subpoenas.”453
He also called for Judge Biery’s
454
impeachment.
On July 11, 2011, the trial court entered an Advisory and Order
Concerning Procedures to Reach Resolution of the Merits of the Case, in
447

448

449
450
451

452

453

454

Jennifer Riley, Texas Valedictorian Can Pray at Graduation, Appeals Court Rules, CHRISTIAN POST (June
4, 2011), https://www.christianpost.com/news/texas-valedictorian-can-pray-at-graduation-appea
ls-court-rules.html.
See Guillermo Contreras, Colorful Judge Biery at Eye of Legal Storm, MY SAN ANTONIO (July 3, 2011,
2:18 AM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Colorful-Judge-Biery-ateye-of-legal-storm-1450798.php (“Some writers or callers [to the federal courthouse] identified
themselves as Christians—then proceeded to say that Biery should ‘die from cancer’ or drink
human waste, or that they will ‘kick his ass.’”).
Id.
See id. (explaining the backlash experienced by Judge Biery).
Id.; Tracy Idell Hamilton, Biery’s the Man Gingrich Just Loves to Hate, MY SAN ANTONIO (Jan. 28,
2012, 12:22 AM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Biery-s-the-manGingrich-just-loves-to-hate-2764583.php.
See Andrew Cohen, Gingrich: Time to Subpoena Federal Judges, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/10/gingrich-time-to-subpoena-federal-judg
es/246407/ (discussing Speaker Gingrich’s critique of Judge Biery).
Matt DeLong, Gingrich: Send U.S. Marshals to Compel ‘Radical’ Judges to Explain Rulings, WASH. POST
(Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/election-2012/post/gingrich-send-usmarshals-to-arrest-uncooperative-judges/2011/12/18/gIQAlYUg2O_blog.html?utm_term=.f38
c2af38b12.
See Johnathan Turley, Gingrich: I Will Arrest Federal Judges, JONATHAN TURLEY BLOG (Dec. 19,
2011), https://jonathanturley.org/2011/12/19/gingrich-i-will-arrest-federal-judges/ (criticizing
Speaker Gingrich’s call for judges to be subpoenaed before Congress as an “attack on the
judiciary”).
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which the court ordered each party to provide “a statement of which judicial
process road that particular party chooses: to attempt sooner and less
expensive resolution or proceed immediately to longer and more expensive
litigation.”455 In this order, the court provided examples of protracted
litigation that “caused considerable divisiveness within the community” and
examples of cases that reached early resolution that saved considerable time
and money.456 The court encouraged the parties to choose the latter path as
a way to safeguard the parties’ time and finite funds.457 The court also
reminded the “adults on both sides [that they] not only have a responsibility
to teach, but also are stewards of financial resources best used for education
of children, as opposed to litigation among adults.”458 Consequently, the
Court encouraged the parties to “conclude the matter, not only sooner and
less expensively, but as a teachable moment and example for the district’s
children of how people of opposing views can listen to one another and
resolve disagreements peaceably.”459
Although the parties entered into alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”),
the court was notified that they did not settle on August 23, 2011.460
Additional ADR did not resolve the case in September of that year.461 The
case proceeded towards trial. On November 7, 2011, Judge Biery entered
an order on the school district’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the
plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint, and the motion for leave to permit an
anonymous plaintiff.462 In this order, the court stated that it had “738 pages”
before it on the pending motions and glibly noted that “there [was] not much
[else] for [the court] to do.”463
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463

Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5-11-CA-422, at 5 (W.D. Tex. July 11, 2011),
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0006.pdf.
Id. at 2.
See id. at 3 (encouraging the use of a more efficient procedure).
Id.
Id. at 4.
Notice of Alternative Dispute Resolution Outcome, Schultz, No. 5:11-cv-00422-FB, available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry No. 40).
Notice of Alternative Dispute Resolution Outcome, Schultz, No. 5:11-cv-00422-FB, available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry No. 42).
See Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5-11-CA-422, 2011 WL 13234771, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 7, 2011).
Id. (noting that there are “about 250 felony defendants to whom the Court is required to give
precedence and about 200 pending civil cases, most of which are older than this matter” and that
“[a]dministrative duties over seven divisions spread over 90,000 square miles and about 800 Court
employees also take considerable time”).
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The Court also emphasized that “the parties are spending what appears
to be inordinate amounts of money and time which could be better spent on
educating students.”464 Thereafter, the court granted the motion to amend
the complaint, denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction due to mootness
based on the claims of the amended complaint, and allowed the anonymous
plaintiff to proceed as such for a time until disclosure was required for
discovery.465 Echoing the court in Santa Fe, which allowed anonymous
student plaintiffs,466 the court expressed its sadness “that youngsters fear the
people within their own community and some of the adults responsible for
their education” because the “pleadings on the issue . . . document[ed] a
pattern of harassment, threats and intimidation of those who disagree with
the majority view in the school district community.”467
The trial court never determined whether the student graduation prayers
were government speech or private speech for the purposes of Establishment
Clause analysis, because, ultimately, the parties settled.468 The parties’
settlement agreement was approved by the court on February 9, 2012.469 In
reviewing the settlement agreement, the court found that “it achieve[d]
reasonable balance between competing First Amendment rights of free
speech for student speakers and freedom from government endorsement of
a particular religious belief.”470
In this settlement agreement, the parties agreed that “The School District
[would] not include a prayer—whether referred to as a prayer, blessing,
invocation, benediction, or otherwise—as part of the official program of any
graduation ceremony”; that the student remarks would be labeled with a
non-religious term in the program; and that the school district would not
invite graduation speakers who it had “reason to believe will proselytize,
promote religion, or disparage the religious beliefs (or lack thereof) of
students or members of the community during their remarks.”471 With

464
465
466
467
468

469
470
471

Id.
See id. at *1–2 (stating the holdings on the motions).
See supra text accompanying note 163 (explaining that the Santa Fe court allowed student plaintiffs
to proceed anonymously).
Schultz, 2011 WL 13234771, at *2.
See Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, 2012 WL 517518, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2012) (approving settlement), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0001.pdf.
See id. (approving settlement).
Id.
Id. at *2.
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respect to student graduation remarks, the parties agreed that the school
district would “not restrict, revise, edit, alter, or otherwise influence [or prescreen] the content of Student Remarks”; that the district “may permit
student graduation speakers to pray as part of Student Remarks”; and that a
disclaimer, akin to the following, would be printed in the graduation program
and announced at the ceremony:
The students who shall be speaking at graduation were selected based on
neutral criteria to deliver messages of the students’ own choices. The content
of each student speaker’s message is the private expression of the individual
student and does not reflect the endorsement, sponsorship, position, or
expression of the District. We ask that the audience sit and remain seated
during the Student Remarks.472

This Establishment Clause litigation was long, costly, and contentious,
like most of these First Amendment religion and school cases.473 Judge
Biery’s Personal Statement in the court’s opinion approving the settlement
provided a clear coda to another cautionary tale within Establishment Clause
jurisprudence:
During the course of this litigation, many have played a part: To the United
States Marshal Service and local police who have provided heightened
security: Thank you. To those Christians who have venomously and
vomitously cursed the Court family and threatened bodily harm and
assassination: In His name, I forgive you. To those who have prayed for my
death: Your prayers will someday be answered, as inevitably trumps
probability. To those in the executive and legislative branches of
government who have demagogued this case for their own political goals:
You should be ashamed of yourselves. To the lawyers who have advocated
professionally and respectfully for their clients’ respective positions: Bless
you.474

4. Lessons to be Learned from the Lack of Clarity of this Case
This case is also paradigmatic of the lack of clarity and continued
confusion regarding the Establishment Clause and the classification of
student religious speech as government speech or private speech. Although
472
473

474

Id. at *2–3.
See Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch?: A Comment on Professor Paulsen’s Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 883, 898 (1993) (noting that Establishment Clause litigation is expensive and that “within
small communities, [it] is unusually divisive and difficult for families who have the courage to pursue
it”); William Marshall, The Limits of an Establishment Clause “Restatement”: A Response to Professor Sedler,
43 WAYNE L. REV. 1465, 1471 (1997) (“Establishment Clause litigation is often as divisive as it is
contentious.”).
Schultz, No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, at 3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2012), available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0001.pdf.

June 2020]

JUSTICIABILITY AND JUDICIAL FIAT

975

the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over the justiciable issue raised on appeal,
the appellate court failed to provide an opinion reflective of the fundamental
jurisprudential principles of hierarchical precedent.
Despite the court’s signal that the litigation hinged on the classification of
the student graduation prayer as either government speech or private speech,
it provided no discussion of this issue beyond its finding that the plaintiffs had
not “shown that they are substantially likely to prevail on the merits,
particularly on the issue that the individual prayers or other remarks to be
given by students at graduation are, in fact, school-sponsored.”475 While the
appellate court was not charged with making a final substantive
determination on the classification of the student religious speech, it still had
a judicial obligation to provide reasoned support for its finding the plaintiffs
had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood they would prevail on the
merits that this student prayer was school-sponsored speech, not private
speech. Instead, the Fifth Circuit opted to issue an eight-sentence judicial
fiat that lacked a single reference to the Constitution, the Establishment
Clause, or any case law.476
This failure to provide any legal analysis to support its conclusion on the
speech classification was jurisprudential error. Even during exigent
circumstances,477 the judiciary needs to provide reasoned judgments for
parties in dispute.478 Reasoned legal judgment, by its very nature,
encompasses reasoning and an express application of precedent.479 Between
the parties and the amicus brief, ninety-one pages of briefing, replete with
binding, relevant Supreme Court precedent and constitutional citations, had
475
476
477

478

479

Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486, at 1 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011).
See id. at 1–2 (finding that plaintiffs had not shown that they were substantially likely to prevail on
the merits).
Although it does take some time to reach a reasoned response, interlocutory appeals, like this one,
do not require an ex tempore decision. See Deborah J. Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student Evaluations of
Teaching, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 235, 278 (2008) (“To make thoughtful evaluations, the brain needs
time to recall diverse bits of data, compare them, group pieces of information into larger chunks of
partial judgments, and ultimately yield a reasoned response.”).
See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2008) (describing how
judicial authority is derived through the provision of “reasons for . . . rules, commands, orders, or
instructions”).
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE
L.J. 710, 712–13 (1917) (stating that an understanding and application of legal precedent is the
“formal foundation of judicial reasoning and decision”); Gerald J. Postema, Jurisprudence, the Sociable
Science, 101 VA. L. REV. 869, 885 (2015) (arguing that effective jurisprudence relies upon the
application of past precedents).
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been filed to assist in such reasoning.480 However, the Fifth Circuit chose
another option that is not reflective of the core ideals of the application of
hierarchical precedent in the American judicial system of rules and
constitutional standards.481 Like Matthews, this is another example of harmful
ipse dixit in action.482
Issuing such an opinion in such a contentious and divisive case was
insufficient for several reasons. First, this was a missed opportunity by the
circuit court to provide much needed clarity in this area of classification of
student religious speech in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1292,483 interlocutory appeals are designed to “simplify . . . the
future course of litigation” and to “reduce the burdens of future
proceedings.”484 The eight-sentence order, with no reference to case law or
the Constitution, achieved neither of these goals. The Fifth Circuit could
have positively contributed to the cloudy area of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence involving the religious speech of students, but it failed to do so.
Opinions via judicial fiat, like this one, also degrade and delegitimize
constitutional interpretation in this important area of school law. The Fifth
Circuit’s opinion contributed to a public perception of results-based
jurisprudence.485 Its absence of reasoning lent itself to capitalization by
elected politicians who asserted that the appellate opinion set a precedent
that it did not set.486 Its lack of analytical support and citation to hierarchical
precedent certainly did nothing to quell the extant political demagoguery of
the case, and it likely allowed for the continued inflammatory rhetoric about

480
481

482
483
484
485
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See supra text accompanying note 400.
See Jess M. Krannich et al., Beyond “Thinking Like A Lawyer” and the Traditional Legal Paradigm: Toward
A Comprehensive View of Legal Education, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 381, 389 (2009) (describing the
American judicial system as a rules-based system).
See supra text accompanying notes 375–77 (discussing the Matthews opinion).
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2018) (giving the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review district court’s
injunctive relief orders prior to the district court’s final decision).
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995).
See Andrew Cohen, Judge-Bashing Comes to the 2012 GOP Race, ATLANTIC (Dec. 27, 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/12/judge-bashing-comes-to-the-2012-goprace/250385/ (characterizing the Fifth Circuit’s decision as “a convenient cop-out by a federal
court unwilling to address the merits of the Supreme Court’s school prayer precedent”).
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 434 (discussing Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott’s
characterization of Schultz).
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the trial court’s decision within the political arena.487 This led to real harms
in the form of overwhelming threats to the bodily and reputational integrity
of Judge Biery, his family, and the courthouse staff.488
The Fifth Circuit’s judicial fiat also harmed both religion and the state.
It hurt religious liberty and sanctity, as it sent negative messaging to both
adherents and non-adherents of religion through the court “blithely
dispatch[ing] with the case,” and not affording this complex and important
constitutional issue sufficient analysis.489 In terms of state harms, the Fifth
Circuit’s judicial fiat on interlocutory appeal did not provide any
simplification or clarification for the proceedings once they returned to the
trial court, as beneficial interlocutory opinions should do.490 The result was
contentious and expensive litigation, as well as an exponential strain on the
already limited resources of the district court. Finally, this cursory circuit
opinion conveyed an anti-democratic principle to the Medina Valley ISD
schoolchildren—that a judicial edict can be based just on a rationale of
because the court said so and not on the application of the Constitution and
hierarchical precedent. If faced with similar cases in the future, all courts
should avoid the harmful jurisprudential approach of the Fifth Circuit in the
Schultz case.
IV. A JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK THAT REQUIRES JUSTICIABILITY
AND AVOIDS JUDICIAL FIAT IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES
INVOLVING RELIGIOUS SPEECH OF STUDENTS
Requiring justiciability and avoiding ruling by judicial fiat are both
matters of judicial restraint.491 The need for judicial restraint, broadly, has
487

488

489

490
491

See Benjamin P. Edwards, When Fear Rules in Law’s Place: Pseudonymous Litigation as a Response to
Systematic Intimidation, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 462 (2013) (discussing the threats and backlash
against Judge Biery after the Fifth Circuit’s intervention in the case).
See Cohen, supra note 13 (discussing the threats that were directed toward the judge, his family, and
his staff after the trial court order and the Fifth Circuit decision); Hamilton, supra note 451
(discussing the intimidation that resulted from the criticism of the trial court’s order after the Fifth
Circuit’s decision).
Cohen, supra note 485; see also Bonnie Barron, 5th Circuit Lets Texans Pray at H.S. Graduation,
COURTHOUSE NEWS (June 8, 2011), https://www.courthousenews.com/5th-circuit-lets-texanspray-at-h-s-graduation/ (noting that the court admitted the opinion was “hastily issued”).
See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309–10 (1995) (discussing the benefits that interlocutory review
should provide).
See Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once “New Judicial Federalism” and Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REV.
5, 7 (1989) (identifying criticism of “rule by judicial fiat” as a call for “judicial restraint”); Philip A.
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been a consensus point throughout the jurisprudential ideological
spectrum,492 as it has been called for by proponents of classical and modern
liberalism,493 advocates for conservatism,494 and centrist process theorists
who disavow the espousal of any of these views and who are “merely seeking
to preserve ‘public faith in the objectivity and detachment of the [courts].’”495
Like so many aspects of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, though, the
concept of “judicial restraint” lacks a unified definition.496 It means many
things to many people, and that construct can shift with the sands.497 For
example, judicial restraint has been used as the antithesis of “judicial
activism.”498 Judicial activism in this context is typically framed to mean
decision-making with which the source does not agree or decision-making
that is extolled if it fits within the preferred jurisprudential approach of the
source.499 Sadly, the notion of judicial restraint has become a highly

492

493

494
495
496
497

498

499

Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in General Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 707 (1999) (“Justiciability constraints constitute the essence of judicial
restraint[.]”).
See Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
249, 249 (2000) (noting that many advocate judicial restraint); Zachary Baron Shemtob, Following
Thayer: The Many Faces of Judicial Restraint, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 61, 62 (2011) (discussing how
liberals and conservatives have both championed judicial restraint).
See, e.g., MILL, supra note 1, at 403 (advocating for judicial restraint in the forms of justiciability and
application of precedent); Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court; A Sense of Judicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES
(July 22, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/22/us/the-supreme-court-a-sense-of-judiciallimits.html (characterizing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg as “a judicial-restraint liberal”).
See Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645, 1678 (2017) (discussing
traditional conservative reliance on judicial restraint).
G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1125 (2005) (quoting
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and its Judicial Critics, 6 UTAH L. REV. 457, 466 (1959)).
See David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137,
137 (2011) (“‘Judicial restraint’ is not a well-defined term.”).
See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA.
L. REV. 483, 502 (2012) (discussing the evolving and changing embraces of notions of judicial
restraint by conservative and liberal jurists and legal theorists).
See J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1981) (“The opposite of juridical activism [is] judicial restraint”); Corey Rayburn
Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2011) (deeming judicial activism’s antithesis to be restraint).
See Joseph Isenbergh, Activists Vote Twice, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 159 (2003) (“Judicial activism has
a bipolar press . . . . [W]hen a high-profile decision cuts against [scholars’] preferential grain, they
denounce it; and when it promises to advance their favored vision of the future, they wax
rhapsodic.”).
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politicized one, and, in a meta way, critiques of highly politicized judicial
restraint have become highly politicized.500
Yet, this politicization of judicial restraint need not be the norm. Ideal
judicial restraint can be articulated in a non-polemical and ideologically
inclusive way. Judicial restraint can mean advocacy for basic justiciability
requirements and a common recognition that lower courts in interpreting
the Constitution should follow hierarchical precedent, should apply that
precedent, and should provide a reasoned, articulated, and explicit
application of that precedent in their judicial decision-making processes.501
This should be uncontroversial.502 However, despite the clarity of this
proposed foundation for ideal jurisprudence, this type of “judicial restraint
has frequently gone unrealized in practice.”503 This has certainly become an
issue within the growing body of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
involving the religious speech of students.504
Given the clarity of the requirement of justiciability for judicial decisionmaking, hierarchical precedent, and the fundamental government
speech/private speech dichotomy, continued controversies regarding how to
classify students’ religious speech must indicate a gap in school law
500

501

502

503
504

See, e.g., Frank Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to
Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 59 (1997) (discussing the viability of a perspective that calls
for “judicial restraint of majoritarian excess without undue politicization of the judiciary”); Roger
Pilon, A Court Without a Compass, N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 999, 1010 (arguing that “both sides [of the
conservative and liberal judiciary] play the ‘judicial restraint’ card”); Ilya Shapiro, Introduction,
2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (“Living constitutionalists and their judicial-restraint
handmaidens have politicized the law such that judges quail at enforcing the Constitution’s
structural limits and face attacks for not seeing statutes in a way that favors ‘the little guy.’’); Conor
Fierdersdorf, Movement Liberals Cannot Credibly Demand Judicial Restraint, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/movement-liberals-cannot-credibly-dem
and-judicial-restraint/255375/ (discussing the politicization of judicial restraint by both
conservatives and liberals).
See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, Realigning Parties, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 109, 129
(2014) (discussing the consensus on the core live case or controversy and adverse party justiciability
requirements).
But see Pfander & Birk, supra note 80, at 1360 (stating the adverse party requirement of justiciability
“sits uneasily with the reality of federal judicial practice”); James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable
Interests, and Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 189 (2018)
(“Noncontentious jurisdiction . . . casts doubt upon three core elements of modern ‘case-orcontroversy’ jurisprudence.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 134
(2007) (arguing that “advisory opinions should not be viewed as constitutionally forbidden”).
Shemtob, supra note 492, at 62.
See Russell W. Galloway Jr., Basic Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845, 848
(1989) (noting repeated “justiciability problems . . . in Establishment Clause cases”).
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence.505 The Matthews and Schultz cases
demonstrate the practical and jurisprudential harms that can result from an
undisciplined judicial approach via advisory opinions or summary opinions
based on judicial fiat, rather than express applications of binding precedent
to justiciable issues, to these classifications. In response to this problem, this
Article offers a clear framework for courts to use in their evaluation of
students’ religious speech in school law Establishment Clause cases.
This dual-pronged framework consists of a justiciability requirement and
a precedential requirement. First, it requires justiciability in order for a court
to make any Establishment Clause determination, which requires a live
Establishment Clause case or controversy between parties with adverse legal
interests on that issue. If this justiciability requirement is not met, courts
cannot and should not issue an impermissible advisory opinion. Instead, a
lack of justiciability necessitates the cessation of any judicial Establishment
Clause analysis and decision-making. If and only if the justiciability
prerequisite is met, the framework next requires courts to make a proper and
fully supported classification of the religious student speech as government
speech or private speech through an application of the United States
Constitution and binding precedent rather than through mere ipse dixit.506
To properly apply the Establishment Clause in cases involving students’
religious speech, courts cannot simply ignore existing precedent in this area
of jurisprudence or issue summary opinions of judicial fiat. Overall, this
framework will help courts to make the government speech/private speech
determination accurately at the outset of Establishment Clause litigation if
they have the requisite justiciability to do so and in a way that will bring
much needed clarity to establishment doctrine in school law, rather than
further complicating this area of jurisprudence.
A. The Requirements of Justiciability in Establishment Clause Cases Involving
Religious Speech of Students
At the center of American jurisprudence is the fundamental principle of
justiciability. This is a particularly important aspect of constitutional
505
506

See Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 501, at 127 (discussing how legal commentary has sometimes
overlooked “the necessity for an adversarial context” in justiciability scholarship).
See Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 568 (1997) (“[J]udges are required to provide reasons for the
decisions they reach.”).
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jurisprudence as it respects “the proper—and properly limited—role of the
courts in a democratic society.”507 Like Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
questions of justiciability can be confusing and conceptually unclear.508 In
Flast v. Cohen, the Supreme Court recognized that “justiciability is itself a
concept of uncertain meaning and scope” and is not “susceptible of [sic]
scientific verification.”509
Still, certain aspects of justiciability, just like certain aspects of
Establishment Clause doctrine, are clear. Justiciability requires an actual
case or controversy between actually adverse parties in order for federal
courts to make a determination on that issue.510 Some state courts, like those
in Texas, are constitutionally bound to commensurate case-or-controversy
requirements for justiciability.511 Requests for advisory opinions are requests
for courts to rule on nonjusticiable matters without a live case or controversy
and without an actual dispute between adverse parties. There is no
justiciable controversy when parties seek an advisory opinion.512
The first hurdle in clarifying school law Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is satisfying the requirement of a justiciable issue for any
Establishment Clause determinations, which entails a live case or controversy
between parties with adverse interests on that issue. These cases, like others
, can and should be litigated amicably, but for a court to proceed, there still
“must be an actual controversy[] and adverse interests.”513 Courts have an

507
508

509
510

511
512

513

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) (describing the case-or-controversy justiciability
requirements as having “an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged
complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government”); Caprice L.
Roberts, Asymmetric World Jurisprudence, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569, 584 (2009) (stating most
justiciability “doctrines are not absolute conceptually”).
Flast, 392 U.S. at 95.
See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (holding “the absence of a genuine adversary
issue between the parties” made the case not justiciable); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,
361 (1911) (providing federal courts may only decide “actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants”).
See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2012) (identifying the Texas
Constitution as the source of justiciability requirements for Texas courts).
See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (explicitly stating there is “no justiciable controversy . . . when the parties
are asking for an advisory opinion”); Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 147 (stating that Texas requests for
advisory opinions are nonjusticiable).
Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 255 (1850).
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affirmative duty to examine the record to determine if there is a lack of the
required actual case or controversy between actually adverse parties.514
If this justiciability requirement is not met, courts cannot and should not
issue an impermissible advisory opinion. Instead, a lack of justiciability
necessitates the cessation of any judicial Establishment Clause analysis and
decision-making. Seeking an impermissible advisory opinion is an attempt
to circumvent the requirements of justiciability, and trial courts should reject
such requests in no uncertain terms as advisory opinions are “nullit[ies].”515
All of these justiciability requirements were met in the Santa Fe case, as
there was an actual controversy regarding whether the football game
invocation policy was a violation of the Establishment Clause between the
school district and the Doe plaintiffs, who had adverse legal interests in the
matter.516 The court limited its decision-making to that actual Establishment
Clause controversy, it “made no sweeping pronouncements barring religious
speech from public settings,”517 and it did not venture into the territory of
nonjusticiability.
Conversely, when courts in systems that prohibit advisory opinions make
determinations on nonjusticiable issues,518 they act outside of their powers
and err as a matter of law. This was the case in Matthews, when the trial court
made its determination that “[n]either the Establishment Clause nor any
other law prohibits the cheerleaders from using religious-themed banners at
school sporting events. Neither the Establishment Clause nor any other law
requires Kountze I.S.D. to prohibit the inclusion of religious-themed banners
at school sporting events.”519 Federal and state courts should learn a lesson
from this nonjusticiable advisory opinion in Matthews that led to years of
protracted litigation and a continued state of confusion for Texas school
districts. Avoiding impermissible advisory opinions in these cases is
imperative to not exacerbate the confusion in this area of constitutional law.
Alternative approaches create significant harms, which include the
514
515
516
517
518
519

See supra text accompanying notes 85–93.
Lord, 49 U.S. at 256.
See supra Part II.A.
Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court’s Emerging Consensus on the Line Between
Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 681, 706–07 (2001).
The arguments regarding prohibited advisory opinions in this Article are geared toward those
judicial systems that have this prohibition.
See Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8,
2013).
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delegitimization of this area of constitutional interpretation, as well as
corresponding harms to the state and religion.
Issuing advisory opinions in school law Establishment Clause cases
contributes to the already confused state of this area of jurisprudence.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is notoriously confusing, as are
justiciability requirements.520 When courts act outside of the constraints of
justiciability requirements when construing the religion clauses of the First
Amendment, this confusion is only magnified.521 Distortions of the law
naturally occur when there is a lack of adversity between the parties with
respect to the sought-after judicial declaration on that issue. Departures
from justiciability in this area of school law will result in case dispositions that
“lack the clarity and force which ought to inform the exercise of judicial
authority.”522
Issuing advisory opinions in school law Establishment Clause cases also
delegitimizes constitutional interpretation in this area. As the Supreme
Court stated in its 1850 Lord v. Veazie decision, attempts to obtain judicial
resolutions of issues “when there is no real and substantial controversy
between those who appear as adverse parties to the suit, is an abuse which
courts of justice have always reprehended, and treated as a punishable
contempt of court.”523 The aim of justiciability is the protection of the law
and the adjudicatory process.524 By issuing Establishment Clause decisions
in school law cases only when justiciability requirements are met, courts will
provide the necessary safeguards to achieve this aim. When courts stray from
these requirements, public perceptions about the judicial process diminish,
especially in cases involving schoolchildren.
Issuing advisory opinions in school law Establishment Clause cases also
contributes to the continued delegitimization of constitutional interpretation

520

521

522
523
524

See Fallon, supra note 12, at 60 (“Establishment Clause doctrine is notoriously confused and
disarrayed.”); Michael L. Wells, A Litigation-Oriented Approach to Teaching Federal Courts, 53 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 857, 870 (2009) (likening the doctrines of justiciability to an “opaque, confusing, and
intricate set of obstacles”).
See Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1009, 1025–26 (2011) (discussing the confusion the Court has engendered by
its justiciability decisions in Establishment Clause litigation).
Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324 (1991).
Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 255 (1850).
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 16 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“It is a
rule whose aim is to protect not parties but the law and the adjudicatory process.”).
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in this area by allowing possible end runs around the Establishment
Clause.525 When a state requests an advisory opinion that a practice
involving religious student speech is not a violation of the Establishment
Clause, when that matter is not the live controversy at issue and there is no
adversity of legal interests, this should indicate a potential red flag to the
judiciary.526 Here, a governmental entity may be trying to maneuver around
the Establishment Clause’s restraints on what was deemed unconstitutional
school-sponsored prayer in Santa Fe to continue this type of unconstitutional
practice. This might be the case “especially in religiously homogeneous areas
where a lack of opposition to the practice may prevent a justiciable case or
controversy from arising.”527
Despite all of the division within this area of jurisprudence, “it seems clear
that the state should not compel people [especially children] to follow the
dictates of any given religion or impose burdens on them for failing to do
so.”528 Claims of free exercise of religion cannot be used as a zero-sum game
to circumscribe the limits of the Establishment Clause. As the Court stated
in Lee, “[t]he principle that government may accommodate the free exercise
of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause.”529 Courts certainly should not allow this practice to
525

526

527
528
529

The term “end run” here means “an evasive trick or maneuver.” End run, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/end%20run (last visited
June 15, 2020). Appropriately, based on the cases scrutinized in this article, the term’s etymology
is from football, meaning “a football play in which the ballcarrier attempts to run wide around the
end of the line” of players. Id. The incorporation of this sports-derived term, with the inclusion of
its specific definition, is intended to be helpful to understand the difficult concepts of justiciability
and the Establishment Clause, and not as a way to accede to a gendered orthodoxy. See Adam
Benforado, Color Commentators of the Bench, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 451, 457 (2011) (arguing sports
analogies “present the best opportunity to demystify the world of law for the widest possible crosssection of the public at a time when distrust of the judicial branch of government is high and when
myths about the work of judges proliferate”); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting in or Opting Out: The
New Legal Process or Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1087 n.4 (1999) (stating that sports analogies
are not helpful when provided without clear definition); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 110 (1992) (describing sports metaphors as “masculinist”); Catherine Weiss &
Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1337 (1988) (framing
a critique of the use of sports analogy in law schools as a gender issue).
Of course, parties may seek to capitalize on litigation in states that allow for advisory opinions to
pursue free exercise and free speech claims as a mechanism for judicial decisions on Establishment
Clause applicability.
Kenneth Katkin & Laurie Lamb, The Establishment Clause: A Survey of Recent Religion Cases Decided
Within the Sixth Circuit, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 73, 112 (2002).
Rubin, supra note 205, at 38–39.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
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occur via an end run around the Establishment Clause in the form of an
advisory opinion.
Finally, issuing advisory opinions in school law Establishment Clause
cases harms both religion and the state. It harms religious liberty, in that a
decision on a nonjusticiable issue involving religious practices or nonreligious
practices that many schoolchildren530 (and their families)531 may hold dear is
made in a context that lacks the full presentation of all relevant information,
as there are no “adverse parties, with a stake in the outcome of the litigation,
[who would] perform this task best.”532 Requesting advisory opinions and
granting those requests also sacrifices judicial efficiency by taking up precious
time and resources in a matter that should not be addressed by the courts.533
Conversely, the early resolution of justiciability issues aims to serve judicial
efficiency, because resolving problems with justiciability concludes litigation
at the appropriate time and in earlier stages.534 For courts that are evaluating
the application of the Establishment Clause to student religious speech, this
justiciability determination should be the first item on the judicial agenda.
Following a justiciability and rules-based jurisprudential approach in this
area of educational constitutional law will “make the judicial process a
principled one.”535
When courts are presented with nonjusticiable requests for prohibited
advisory opinions in Establishment Clause cases, the only correct response is
a denial of such a request based on a lack of justiciability. Courts have the
affirmative duty to inquire as to the justiciability of a case, which means that
they must ensure there is a live controversy with truly adverse parties in order
to proceed.536 Without an actual controversy between actually adverse
530

531
532
533
534

535
536

See Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and State, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1264 (2000) (“The development of a sense of religious identity is an important
piece of the adolescent’s larger identity formation process[, g]oing as it does to the core of one’s
beliefs, values, practices, and affiliations.”).
See id. (discussing the importance parents often place in the reproduction of their own religious
identities in their children).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 44 (6th ed. 2012).
See Siegel, supra note 502, at 87 (“Judges are busy with a multitude of cases.”).
See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324 (1991) (“If the as-applied challenge had been resolved first
in this case, the problems of justiciability that determine our disposition might well have concluded
the litigation at an earlier stage.”).
Id.
See Hatfield v. King, 184 U.S. 162, 164–65 (1902) (stating that it is well settled that a court has the
duty to make justiciability inquiries “in order that it may not be imposed on by an apparent
controversy to which there are really no adverse parties”).
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parties on the issue, courts lack the authority to decide the matter. The Texas
trial court in Matthews failed to take this correct jurisprudential course, and
the effect was years of costly and unnecessary litigation that only served to
complicate the area of Establishment Clause applicability to religious student
speech even more and to create perceptions of distortion of the legal process
and religious values.537 Consequently, courts must not render advisory
opinions in cases dealing with religious student speech that do not have a live
Establishment Clause controversy between truly adverse parties. If trial
courts incorrectly do so, appellate courts have the sua sponte responsibility to
vacate the nonjusticiable issue determination. This is a necessary way to
ameliorate the current state of confusion within school law Establishment
Clause jurisprudence when courts are tasked with the classification of
religious student speech as being government speech or private speech.
B. The Avoidance of Judicial Fiat in Establishment Clause Cases Involving Religious
Student Speech
If and only if the prerequisites of justiciability are met, should courts
proceed to classify religious student speech as government speech or private
speech for a determination of an alleged Establishment Clause violation.538
When doing so, courts must make this classification through an application
of the United States Constitution and binding precedent rather than through
mere ipse dixit. To properly apply the Establishment Clause in cases involving
religious speech of students, courts cannot simply issue summary opinions of
judicial fiat with no references to precedent. Unfortunately, unlike the
careful, supported reasoning of the Santa Fe decision, the Matthews and Schultz
cases featured two examples of this type of deleterious judicial fiat. To
disregard a careful and measured approach to Establishment Clause cases
involving the religious speech of students, like these courts did, is to
perpetuate the confusion in and delegitimize this area of jurisprudence,
which harms both religion and the state. Other courts should take care to
avoid judicial fiat in the arena of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
should instead employ an express application of hierarchical precedent as the
basis for their decisions.
537
538

See supra Part III.A.
This applies to all courts, as “American judges have the unique privilege—the privilege of
interpreting constitutional law—at all levels of the American judicial system.” Nancy Gertner, The
Globalized District Court, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 351, 353 (2004).
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The hierarchical precedent doctrine is an axiomatic aspect of the
American judicial system.539 In Hubbard v. United States, the Court stated that,
“We would have thought it self-evident that the lower courts must adhere to
our precedents.”540 When lower federal and state courts are making federal
constitutional decisions, they must follow the Supreme Court’s case law.541
This fundamental component of jurisprudence is “a consideration grounded
in formalism, or the notion that judicial decision making must adhere to
formal legal rules.”542 The alternative to this notion of hierarchical precedent
would be chaos.543 Indeed, in countries without a hierarchical precedent
doctrine, “courts may and often do change their view on the application of
one law or another, and therefore jurisprudence may serve only as a guide,
never as a rule.”544 Unlike these judicial systems, the American judicial
system follows this doctrine, because it is “[a] government of laws[, which]
means a government of rules.”545
When courts work within this system, they derive their judicial power
from reasoned decision-making and not fiat.546 Reasoned judgment relies on
hierarchical precedent and provides an express articulation of the application

539

540
541

542
543
544
545
546

See Caminker, supra note 122, at 820 (stating that “the doctrine of hierarchical precedent . . .
constitutes a virtually undiscussed axiom of adjudication”); Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E.
Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413, 417 (2019)
(“Of course, all courts must follow precedent from the Supreme Court[.]”).
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 713 n.13 (1995).
See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (reaffirming the requirement that state
courts must follow Supreme Court precedent in interpreting the federal constitution); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 47 n.26 (1985) (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982)) (“Federal
district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme
Court.”).
Douglas & Solimine, supra note 539, at 441.
See Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 401, 402 n.6 (1988) (stating the alternative to vertical stare decisis is “so obviously chaos”).
Ioan-Luca Vlad, General Introduction, Romania, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA LAWS: FAMILY
AND SUCCESSION LAW 27 (Aspen ed., 2019).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Colin Starger & Michael Bullock, Legitimacy, Authority, and the Right to Affordable Bail, 26 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 589, 593 n.17 (2018) (“[P]ropositions that do require justification by authority
are fallacious if supported only by ipse dixit argument.”).
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of that precedent.547 Judicial fiat, or judgment that lacks reasoning, runs
contrary to the core values of the hierarchical binding precedent doctrine.548
The basic translation of fiat is “let it be done.”549 Broadly defined, it is a
“governmental decree or order,”550 but it has acquired a negative
connotation when used in the term “judicial fiat.”551 Judicial fiat has been
defined in several different ways. For some, judicial fiat indicates when
“courts make law by broad pronouncement rather than by narrowly deciding
the cases before them.”552 For others, judicial fiat is a criticism of courts when
they “say[] too little.”553 Other perceptions of judicial fiat deem it to be
decision-making “without definition.”554 A common understanding of
judicial fiat is when a court makes a decision based on a rationale of “because
the court said so,” without adequate or even “an iota of . . . interpretation or
citation to legal precedent,”555 rather than based on a reasoned, articulated
judgment derived from the application of binding hierarchical precedent.556
This common understanding is reflected in the criticism of judicial fiat
through the “pejorative use of the phrase ipse dixit.”557 The basic (and
547

548

549
550
551

552
553
554

555
556
557

See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Just Not Who We Are: A Critique of Common Law Constitutionalism, 54 VILL.
L. REV. 181, 205–06 (2009) (stating “reliance on evolving precedent” is what makes “reasoned
judgment [reasoned]—and what makes it reasoned rather than judicial fiat”).
See Tracey E. George, Developing A Positive Theory of Decisionmaking of U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1635, 1642–43 (1998) (discussing how the cornerstones of classical legal theory are the
premise “that judicial decisions were based on logical reasoning” and an emphasis on “the primacy
of rules”); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633–34 (1995) (“Results
unaccompanied by reasons are typically castigated as deficient on precisely those grounds. In law,
and often elsewhere, giving reasons is seen as a necessary condition of rationality.”).
Fiat, WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 423 (3d ed. 2005) (defining fiat as “Lat., let it be
done. 1. An arbitrary decree. 2. Authorization or sanction”).
Fiammetta Piazza, Bitcoin in the Dark Web: A Shadow over Banking Secrecy and A Call for Global Response,
26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 521, 527 (2017).
See William N. Drake, Jr., The Common Law and the Rule of Law: An “Uncomfortable Relationship,” 45
STETSON L. REV. 439, 448 (2016) (“[Fiat] is a term with a negative connotation of authoritarianism
that long had been eschewed by our courts as inapplicable to their function in our system.”).
Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2022 (1994).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (describing Justice Scalia’s perceptions of judicial fiat).
Malcolm J. Harkins III, The Uneasy Relationship of Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, the Affordable Care
Act, and the Corporate Person: How A Historical Myth Continues to Bedevil the Legal System, 7 ST. LOUIS U. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 203–04 (2014).
Ceausu v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV12-6254PSG(VBKx), 2013 WL 12131280, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 10, 2013).
See Bernard Schwartz, “Brennan vs. Rehnquist”––Mirror Images in Constitutional Construction, 19 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 213, 222 (1994) (discussing how judicial fiat disregards precedent).
Dorf, supra note 552, at 2022; see also Schauer, supra note 548, at 634 (“To characterize a conclusion
as an ipse dixit—a bare assertion unsupported by reasons—is no compliment.”).
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gendered) translation of ipse dixit is “he himself said it,”558 or in a nongendered way, “it’s so because I say so.”559 So, ipse dixit is “something said
but not proved.”560 It is a stated, but unproven bare, dogmatic assertion.561
In its application to jurisprudence, the term “is a statement that lacks
reasoning to support its conclusion but, nevertheless, must be taken as true
simply because the court says so.”562
Criticism of judicial fiat has united people from all over the ideological
spectrum. Justice Antonin Scalia argued that jurisprudence based on ipse dixit
is dangerous and “ill-considered,”563 and it results in grievous harm to the
Constitution.564 In Morrison v. Olson, he criticized such a jurisprudential
example that “gutt[ed] in six quick pages devoid of textual or historical
precedent for the novel principle it set forth, a carefully researched and
reasoned 70-page opinion.”565 Justice John Paul Stevens criticized a plurality
opinion in an Establishment Law case as judicial fiat that was “divorced from
the methodology prescribed by [the Court’s] doctrine.”566 Professor Michael
McConnell has argued the Framers themselves had an expectation that the
evolution of their rights would not be the result of judicial fiat.567
The Santa Fe decision was not a decision of judicial fiat. It was the product
of careful reasoning and supported analysis. It certainly did not resort to ipse
dixit. Instead, the Court displayed a devotion to the facts of the disputed
invocation policy and its limited analysis to the establishment dispute at
issue.568 It “engaged in a careful, context-sensitive analysis of why, under the
circumstances of this case, the school district’s argument that the football
game prayers were ‘private speech’ should not be accepted.”569
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567

568
569

Ipse dixit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 833 (7th ed. 1999).
Richard C. Wydick, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Does It Really Have Life Everlasting?, 87 KY. L.J. 1165,
1172 (1999) (providing this translation).
Bryan A. Garner, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 482 (3d ed. 2011).
See id.; Ipse dixit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
Dorf, supra note 552, at 2022.
Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 881, 882 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725–26 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 726.
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 755 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s
“Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1997) (“[T]he people who
instituted the Constitution expected that their traditional rights and privileges would continue to
evolve—not by judicial fiat, but by decentralized processes of legal and cultural change.”).
McConnell, supra note 517, at 706.
Id. at 707.
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Conversely, there have been instances in school law when courts have
issued determinations on Establishment Clause violations or on the
classification question of religious student speech in a cursory, unsupported
way. The Matthews and Schultz cases’ sub-ten-sentence orders and opinions
on core Establishment Clause issues present two prominent examples of this
type of ipse dixit approach to school law decisions. Because Establishment
Clause cases are difficult,570 future courts should avoid this approach to
decision-making regarding the classification of religious student speech and
the extent of the Establishment Clause’s constraints on that speech. Avoiding
judicial fiat in these cases is imperative to not further contribute to the
confusion of this area of constitutional law. Alternative approaches create
significant harms, which include the delegitimization of this area of
constitutional interpretation and harms to religion and to the state.
Issuing cursory opinions by judicial fiat in school law Establishment
Clause cases contributes to continued confusion in an already-confused area
of law. Although “[d]istinguishing between government speech and private
speech is famously difficult,” when tasked to do so on a justiciable issue,
courts need to engage in this endeavor through an application of precedent
and reasoned judgment.571 Here, the issue is not so much the endorsement
of only one bright-line rule of Establishment Clause interpretation in all cases
in the school law setting,572 as that is not consistent with the pluralistic
American society in which these cases arise.573 Instead, this argument calls
on courts to provide some explanation when making these difficult
decisions.574 “Unexplained decisions . . . encourage appeals and make it
570

571
572

573

574

See John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83,
144 (1986) (discussing the difficulty in “reach[ing] principled decisions” in Establishment Clause
cases).
Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV.
972, 1015 (2010).
See Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the Constitutional
Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 570 (1991) (arguing proper
jurisprudential approaches are premised on “principled[] constitutional theories,” even if they are
different approaches).
See Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in Constitutional Law,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1402 (2006) (stating the varietals of Establishment Clause analyses
exemplify a “pluralistic society[’s] . . . idea that different and conflicting world-views can co-exist
within it”).
See Ronald Turner, On Substantive Due Process and Discretionary Traditionalism, 66 SMU L. REV. 841,
877–78 (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the need for constitutional reasoning
in order to have reasoned judgment).
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difficult, even impossible, for the appellate court to determine whether the
lower court erred.”575 Judges need to provide legal rationales for their
decisions in compliance with the doctrine of hierarchical precedent to
preserve basic clarity and core stability in this area of law.576
This becomes especially important when an appellate court takes up an
interlocutory appeal, like the Fifth Circuit did in Schultz.577 This type of
appellate review is “the exception, not the rule”578 and can create confusion
akin to the confusion generated by Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
justiciability requirements. 579 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, federal circuit courts
have jurisdiction to review “all final decisions of the district courts.”580 The
courts of appeals also have jurisdiction to review trial court injunctive
interlocutory orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).581 Although interlocutory
appeals can have beneficial effects for litigants,582 they also “can make it
more difficult for trial judges to do their basic job—supervising trial
proceedings . . . [and] can threaten those proceedings with delay, adding
costs and diminishing coherence.”583 Interlocutory review also “risks
additional, and unnecessary, appellate court work.”584 Consequently,
appellate courts need to take care that they are not acting in an unsupported
575
576

577

578
579

580
581

582

583
584

David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in COMMON LAW
THEORY 134, 148 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007).
See James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, An Announce Clause by Any Other Name: The
Unconstitutionality of Disciplining Judges Who Fail to Disqualify Themselves for Exercising Their Freedom to
Speak, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 723, 727 (2007) (discussing the need for judges to provide legal rationales
in their decisions); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1139,
1159 (2015) (linking adherence to precedent to stability within the law).
See Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011) (order granting
emergency motion to the dissolve temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction).
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995).
Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423,
423 (2013) (“This system of interlocutory appellate review is a mess; the exceptions are so many,
the requirements so vague, and the judicial treatment so inconsistent that the regime is too
complicated and too unpredictable.”).
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018).
Id. § 1292(a)(1) (2018) (giving federal circuit courts jurisdictional review of trial court orders
“granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions” and excepting jurisdiction “where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court”).
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 309 (stating that interlocutory appeals “may avoid injustice by quickly
correcting a trial court’s error[;] . . . can simplify, or more appropriately direct, the future course of
litigation[; and] . . . can thereby reduce the burdens of future proceedings”).
Id.
Id.
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dictatorial way in these interlocutory appeals to avoid these harms to
themselves and the underlying trial courts.
Issuing cursory opinions by judicial fiat in school law Establishment
Clause cases also delegitimizes constitutional interpretation in this area.
Jurisprudence matters. This principle is at the core of constitutional
theory.585 “[I]t is, by adhering to rules and principles in the positive law,
within the constraints of practical reason as incorporated into the law and
the methodology by which it is applied that judges fulfill their constitutional
function of preserving and protecting the boundaries of the laws made by the
people . . . .”586 The judiciary requires those who practice before it to provide
reasoning based on precedent; the courts should require no less of themselves
to ensure the continued legitimacy of the judicial system.587
When judges issue edicts that are not reflective of principled reasoning, it
creates a subversion that implies to the American public, and in school law,
to schoolchildren, that decision-making is premised on desired outcomes,
rather than a reasoned application of the law. That is a perilous position for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence involving the religious speech of
students, as it threatens “the very authority and stability of [our]
constitutional system.”588 The rule of law is constrained, in a positive way,
by the requirements of consistency and transparency.589 “[T]he integrity and
functionality of the [judicial] system depend[] upon the shared expectation
that lawmakers and judges will play by the rules of the game, i.e., that they
will follow the rules and precedents produced by the system itself . . . .”590
Things fall apart with the dissolution of these twin aims in judicial decisionmaking, and the avoidance of such dissolution is paramount in the area of
constitutional school law. In essence, when courts issue a judicial fiat without

585
586
587
588
589

590

See Phelps & Gates, supra note 572, at 570 (“Much of the energy and passion expended on the
pursuit of the constitutional theory is predicated on the notion that jurisprudence matters . . . .”).
Evelyn Keyes, Judicial Strategy and Legal Reason, 44 IND. L. REV. 357, 382 (2011).
See Michael J. Higdon, The Legal Reader: An Exposé, 43 N.M. L. REV. 77, 107 (2013) (“[L]egal readers
expect legal support . . . .”).
Phelps & Gates, supra note 572, at 570.
See A. Christopher Bryant & Kimberly Breedon, How the Prohibition on “Under-Ruling” Distorts the
Judicial Function (and What to Do About It), 45 PEPP. L. REV. 505, 522 (2018) (discussing the problems
that result from the dissolution of the “requirements of consistency and transparency” in judicial
decision-making).
Keyes, supra note 586, at 382.
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any supporting case law, they “sacrifice [their] legitimacy.”591 As Justice
Thurgood Marshall stated, it is “fidelity to precedent” that will create a
public “conception of ‘the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned
judgments.’”592
Rulings by judicial fiat in this area also can suggest subjectivity in
jurisprudence as a way “to secure a political, Machiavellian end.”593 This is
dangerous decision-making, especially in the area of Establishment Clause
cases involving the religious speech of students.594 Conversely, providing
decisions based on articulated reasons through an application of binding
precedent respects the dignitary values of the parties, “reassur[ing] the
litigants that the case has been thoroughly considered by the judge and
satisfies the basic human demand of those affected by judicial action to be
told why.”595
It also communicates to the public positive messaging about the judicial
process.596 Essentially, it “enhance[s] public confidence that a judge is not
simply acting by virtue of his or her power through judicial fiat but rather
through a reasoned process whereby the conclusion leading to his or her
decision is transparent, logical, and reasonable.”597 Such supported reasongiving is at the core of Deweyan ideal educative philosophy, which is an
appropriate ideal for courts to follow in school law jurisprudence.598
Although this requires more work and is more time-intensive, the provision
of such a legal rationale in school law establishment cases is the best way for
591
592
593
594

595
596

597
598

Adam M. Smith, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic Jurisprudence: The Indian
Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218, 264 (2006).
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)).
Ellis Washington, Natural Law Considerations of Juvenile Law, 32 WHITTIER L. REV. 57, 102 (2010).
See Edwards, supra note 487, at 463 (describing the Schultz case as making the unmistakably clear
point that “church-state cases are dangerous”); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 420 (1997) (discussing the dangers of rule by judicial fiat).
Dyzenhaus & Taggart, supra note 575, at 148.
See Donald J. Kochan, The “Reason-Giving” Lawyer: An Ethical, Practical, and Pedagogical Perspective, 26
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 264 (2013) (stating that when people’s desire for reasons is
“[u]nquenched, that thirst also leaves us unsatisfied and generally less accepting in the face of events
or circumstances that are not or cannot be explained”).
Rosemary Barkett, Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 905, 911 (2007).
See JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 27–28 (1910) (arguing the best practices of education “cultivate
deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, and
opinions; . . . develop a lively, sincere, and open-minded preference for conclusions that are
properly grounded, and . . . ingrain into the individual’s working habits [appropriate] methods of
inquiry and reasoning”).
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courts to have these rules make sense to the schoolchildren who are affected
by these decisions.599
Finally, issuing cursory opinions by judicial fiat and without adequate
support in school law Establishment Clause cases harms both church and
state. The Establishment Clause “is primarily an equal liberty provision,”600
designed to provide protections for free exercise and against establishment.
One might say that “[t]he defining paradox of the Establishment Clause is
that it exists to protect the government from religion in order to protect
religion from the government.”601 When courts use ipse dixit to make
determinations in cases involving the religious speech of students, they are
harming both sides of Jefferson’s wall. This jurisprudential approach harms
religious liberty. It harms the judiciary. It harms schoolchildren by teaching
them anti-democratic principles.602 Consequently, this type of unreasoned
decision-making should be avoided in the milieu of school law.
Proper analysis of the Establishment Clause is necessary for both
adherents and non-adherents to religion, especially for minors in schools.603
The religion clauses of the First Amendment are meant “to define the
protection granted to an objector or a dissenting nonbeliever,” as well as to
“protect religion from government interference.”604 James Madison was
opposed to religious establishment not just because of “its effect on the
minority,” but also because of a concern with “‘maintaining the purity and
efficacy of Religion.’”605 So, a failure to engage in reasoned analysis that
incorporates hierarchical precedent in cases involving the religious speech of
599

600
601
602

603
604
605

See Marleen O’Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future
Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1299 (2004) (discussing how child
development theorists state the best approach for children to understand “prosocial behavior” is
through a “purposive and calculated” reasoned explanation, even though this method is “more
hands on, emotionally draining, and time-intensive”).
Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of
Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 568 (1991).
Gey, supra note 207, at 28.
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of
Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 101 (2007) (“[R]eason-giving’s most fundamental
function [is] the creation of authentic democratic governance.”).
See Stanley Ingber, Religious Children and the Inevitable Compulsion of Public Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 773, 792 (1993) (stating that “[s]chools cannot avoid instilling values” in schoolchildren).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589–90 (1992).
Id. at 590 (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (June 20, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1784–1786, at 301
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973)).
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students harms religious liberty, as it can signify to both religious and
nonreligious children that legal matters dealing with students’ religious
practices or conscientious practices do not merit extended treatment and
careful consideration by the judiciary.
Specifically, issuing unsupported decisions that imply that student
religious exercises are of a de minimis character, which will receive only the
court’s abbreviated attention, are affronts to religion and its adherents.606
These opinions communicate a message that cases involving “[r]eligious
faith, [which] is a significant component in the lives of many children,
forming their identity, values, and sense of self-worth in their developing
years,” are cases that merit only cursory review.607 When courts issue
summary dictates regarding Establishment Clause claims, that implies a
potential lack of careful consideration of the matter, which can be perceived
as the judiciary’s lack of respect for such religious faith.
The messaging of the insignificance of minor encroachments through an
ipse dixit opinion also harms non-adherents to religion, especially
impressionable schoolchildren. Courts must ever be mindful of “both the
fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional
scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values
can be eroded.”608 Claimed de minimis Establishment Clause violations or
“minor encroachments” of that clause, if proven, are still Establishment
Clause violations.609 Therefore, they require carefully reasoned judgments
by courts that expressly apply hierarchical precedent. A failure to provide
judgments that reflect the doctrine of hierarchical precedent can create
schisms among students of different religious faiths or no religious faith,
which contradicts the “vital need” that Justice Felix Frankfurter articulated
in the McCollum opinion, “to keep out divisive forces” in American schools
when evaluating Establishment Clause cases.610

606

607
608
609

610

See id. at 594 (stating the characterization of a claimed constitutional “intrusion of the religious
exercise” as being “of a de minimis character . . . would be an affront to the rabbi who offered them
and to all those for whom the prayers were an essential and profound recognition of divine
authority”).
Green, supra note 138, at 848.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[I]t is no defense to urge that the
religious practices [at issue in Establishment Clause cases] may be relatively minor encroachments
on the First Amendment.”).
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).
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Issuing decisions via judicial fiat in school law cases can also harm the
structures in which constitutional judicial decision-making is seated. The
practical and legal harms that can occur because of such a jurisprudential
approach are typified by the events that transpired in the Schultz case after
the issuance of the Fifth Circuit’s eight-sentence opinion.611 After that
opinion, the federal district judge who entered the initial TRO and his staff
were threatened with death and bodily assault.612 It does not seem like a
stretch beyond reason that the Fifth Circuit’s cursory opinion contributed to
a public perception of a lack of legitimacy of the trial court’s initial order
granting the request for injunctive relief at the high school graduation. A
perception of a lack of legitimacy in judicial decision-making can lead to
public resistance to that judicial act.613
Issuing decisions via judicial fiat in school law cases also teaches antidemocratic principles to children and runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s
ideology in the area of school law Establishment Clause cases.614 The Court
has emphasized how vital its school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is because “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.”615 In order for
children “to become self-fulfilling, self-sustaining adults who can contribute
to the civic community,”616 state institutions, like the courts, need to model
the ways to best achieve this maturation. Consequently, courts need to
function in a way that best represents the core ideals of our civic democracy
through supported judicial reasoning and not ipse dixit. As Professor Glen
Staszewski has stated, “[i]n a true democracy, citizens are ordinarily entitled
to a more meaningful explanation for the official exercise of coercive

611
612
613

614

615
616

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
See Kochan, supra note 596, at 267–68 (“[R]eason-giving demands a check of power and helps the
governed determine whether those in power are acting within their constraints . . . . [T]his helps
to engender a more democratic relationship with the giver and receiver. Reasons add legitimacy
and deviations from given reasons tend to call action into question.”).
See David Schimmel, Studying the Massachusetts Goodridge Decision on Same-Sex Marriage as an Antidote to
Mutual Misunderstanding and a Lesson in Civics and Law, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 495, 512 (2011)
(arguing that “thoughtful and wise decision-making” is necessary “in our pluralistic constitutional
democracy”).
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487
(1960)).
Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 350 (1994).
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authority.” 617 This applies with equal if not more resonant force for the
requisite judicial reason-giving to schoolchildren when a court is making a
decision regarding the religious speech of students and the Establishment
Clause, given that “[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our
democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common
destiny.”618 Consequently, religious student speech in the public school
context presents “unique circumstances” that require cautious and careful
judicial scrutiny in the area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.619 If
courts are to teach democratic principles to impressionable schoolchildren in
this area of law,620 courts must avoid a judicial fiat approach.
A legal judgment regarding a case that alleges a violation of the
Establishment Clause based on the religious speech of students requires
adherence to the hierarchical precedent doctrine and express articulation of
the same. The application of the Establishment Clause “requires
interpretation of a delicate sort.”621 When courts are making determinations
on Establishment Clause claims in the context of religious student speech,
they need to provide that delicate and careful interpretation through an
express and supported application of Supreme Court precedent. This is the
only way for this area of jurisprudence to begin to find some much needed
clarity, to retain its legitimacy, to protect against state and religious harms,
and to ensure American schoolchildren have sufficient safeguards through
more than “mere platitudes.”622 Although “Establishment Clause cases . . .
stir deep feelings[] and we are divided among ourselves,” courts must take
these cases head-on when there is justiciability to do so and accord them the
proper reasoned analysis that our nation and our schoolchildren deserve.623

617
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623

Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1286 (2009).
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596–97 (1992) (highlighting the differences of Establishment
Clause cases that arise in “the public school context” versus other environments); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Every government practice must
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or
disapproval of religion.”).
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987) (discussing students’ impressionability);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971) (emphasizing “the impressionable age of the pupils,
in primary schools particularly”).
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
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CONCLUSION
The Establishment Clause seeks to prevent division along religious
lines.624 Yet, the interpretation of this clause has created expansive
divisiveness.625 Arguably, this jurisprudence is fractured to the point where
“diversity and multiplicity in Establishment Clause doctrine are endemic and
ineradicable.”626 It is possible that no other area of constitutional
jurisprudence is quite as complex.627 Given the fluidity of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence,628 it is hard to find a coherent theory within this
doctrine.629 This has created rampant controversy among scholars and
jurists as to how courts should approach these cases. Although some of this
discussion has been polemical,630 most of this division is simply a reflection
of the seemingly inconsistent nature of First Amendment jurisprudence.631
Indeed, it almost seems that every Establishment Clause case should begin
with the Walrus’s speech in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass and What
624
625

626
627

628

629

630
631

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014) (articulating this core purpose of the
Establishment Clause).
See NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 227 (“Recent Establishment Clause cases look like a mess. The
proliferation of standards and distinctions is perplexing even to scholars.”); Shari Seidman
Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713, 713 (2001) (discussing
the lack of “unified Establishment Clause doctrine”).
Fallon, supra note 12, at 72.
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Alice Found There: “‘The time has come,’ the Walrus said, ‘To talk of many
things: Of shoes—and ships—and sealing-wax—Of cabbages—and kings—
And why the sea is boiling hot—And whether pigs have wings.”’632 Yet, there
is at least one point of consensus in this confusion and division,633 which even
the Supreme Court admitted in a school law case: “Establishment Clause
cases are not easy.”634
Much of the Court’s establishment doctrine in the area of education
remains inconsistent, unclear, and disputed.635 Despite this division and
confusion, courts have an obligation to attempt to decipher that doctrine
when evaluating student religious speech constitutional claims when there is
justiciability to do so and, if so, through the application of the rule of law and
pursuant to binding precedent. This is the only way to clarify the muddy
waters of this area of school law.636
A failure to do so constitutes judicial error, and it results in exponential
jurisprudential and practical harms. One needs to look only to the Matthews
and Schultz cases’ judicial approaches to the Establishment Clause’s
applicability to student religious speech to see the harms of advisory opinions
and opinions by judicial fiat. An advisory opinion or ipse dixit approach to
these cases contributes to the continued confusion of school law
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; delegitimizes constitutional
interpretation in this area; allows possible end runs around the Establishment
Clause; harms religious liberty; harms the administration of the judicial
system; and teaches anti-democratic principles to citizens and
632

633

634
635
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schoolchildren. Courts that have disregarded the core principles of
justiciability and hierarchical precedent have confusingly converted school
law Establishment Clause jurisprudence into a sword that harms religion and
the state, rather than preserving it as the shield that it was meant to be for
both parts of the axiomatic Jeffersonian principle.637 These injurious
jurisprudential practices must stop. Ensuring justiciability and avoiding
judicial fiat are the mechanisms to do so.

637

See JEFFERSON, supra note 60, at 113 (“Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the
legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature
should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’
thus building a wall of separation between church and State.”).

